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Post by mslo79 on Jun 22, 2018 0:33:12 GMT
not in relation to the specific issue in the topic, but in general it seems to be like this in some cases lately...
given the way many on the left are nowadays... the answer to that is, when your a conservative. everything is cool until you say something they don't like and then they call it 'hate' speech etc.
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Post by goz on Jun 22, 2018 2:20:31 GMT
not in relation to the specific issue in the topic, but in general it seems to be like this in some cases lately... given the way many on the left are nowadays... the answer to that is, when your a conservative. everything is cool until you say something they don't like and then they call it 'hate' speech etc. Well, the NSW government disagreed with you and passed the law. It made the definition between freedom of speech and harassment so that protesters could still peacefully protest, just NOT geographically close to an abortion clinic which forms harassment under the law. Left or right, there are opportunities to exercise your right of free speech, butt 'hate' speech is another level on both sides. It is usually sexist racist, often untrue, inciting to violence or open to interpretation, and in my country, anyway, illegal.
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Post by PreachCaleb on Jun 26, 2018 15:20:57 GMT
...because previously, protesters exercising their freedom of speech, had been preventing free access to the abortion clinic. WHILST they had been exercising their right of freedom of speech, they had 'harrassed' by their blocking of free access of others to a legal activity. That would be a conflation. Speech isn't the same thing as something like blocking the entrance to a building, blocking a road, etc. And blocking a building isn't harassing anyone, speech or not. Causing people to panic and stampeded could result in injuries or death. No speech is worth that.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 26, 2018 17:49:01 GMT
That would be a conflation. Speech isn't the same thing as something like blocking the entrance to a building, blocking a road, etc. And blocking a building isn't harassing anyone, speech or not. Causing people to panic and stampeded could result in injuries or death. No speech is worth that. Speech isn't causal. For one, do you not buy the notion of free will?
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Post by PreachCaleb on Jun 26, 2018 18:14:27 GMT
Causing people to panic and stampeded could result in injuries or death. No speech is worth that. Speech isn't causal. For one, do you not buy the notion of free will? Speech is very causal. That's why we have laws preventing certain things. Free will is a non-issue when there's a stampeding mob running people over. We can't will ourselves out of being crushed.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 26, 2018 23:27:36 GMT
Speech isn't causal. For one, do you not buy the notion of free will? Speech is very causal. That's why we have laws preventing certain things. Free will is a non-issue when there's a stampeding mob running people over. We can't will ourselves out of being crushed. I disagree that it's causal (obviously, since I had just said as much), and there's an easy way to show that speech is not causal. Put me in a situation where someone utters something that you believe would cause panic and a stampede, then watch my reaction. (Of course, I'm not the only test subject who would not have the reaction you'd be predicting, but I'm one test subject who would not. Any test subject who wouldn't have the predicted reaction would falsify the hypothesis that speech is causal to the behavior in question.)
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Post by goz on Jun 26, 2018 23:44:13 GMT
Speech is very causal. That's why we have laws preventing certain things. Free will is a non-issue when there's a stampeding mob running people over. We can't will ourselves out of being crushed. I disagree that it's causal (obviously, since I had just said as much), and there's an easy way to show that speech is not causal. Put me in a situation where someone utters something that you believe would cause panic and a stampede, then watch my reaction. (Of course, I'm not the only test subject who would not have the reaction you'd be predicting, but I'm one test subject who would not. Any test subject who wouldn't have the predicted reaction would falsify the hypothesis that speech is causal to the behavior in question.) I am far from an expert, however I have studied both anthropology and psychology at a tertiary level as well as English. Consider this: At a mammalian level (and probably before) vocalisation as a warning has evolved in evolution to protect the species. It is most definitely 'causal' in the sense that the reason for the vocalisation is as an audible warning of danger to others in the species. This applies to speech as a communicator in humans. Hence the vocal cues have developed in human speech with certain sounds communicating as warnings. Such words as 'fire' can be considered such a verbal cure. There is also the issue of tonal differences and volume to account for such a verbal message to be accepted by a group as a 'warning'. These are learned language behaviours which hark back to more primal times yet can be viewed as causal to those who understand the verbal cues.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 26, 2018 23:55:25 GMT
I disagree that it's causal (obviously, since I had just said as much), and there's an easy way to show that speech is not causal. Put me in a situation where someone utters something that you believe would cause panic and a stampede, then watch my reaction. (Of course, I'm not the only test subject who would not have the reaction you'd be predicting, but I'm one test subject who would not. Any test subject who wouldn't have the predicted reaction would falsify the hypothesis that speech is causal to the behavior in question.) I am far from an expert, however I have studied both anthropology and psychology at a tertiary level as well as English. Consider this: At a mammalian level (and probably before) vocalisation as a warning has evolved in evolution to protect the species. It is most definitely 'causal' in the sense that the reason for the vocalisation is as an audible warning of danger to others in the species. This applies to speech as a communicator in humans. Hence the vocal cues have developed in human speech with certain sounds communicating as warnings. Such words as 'fire' can be considered such a verbal cure. There is also the issue of tonal differences and volume to account for such a verbal message to be accepted by a group as a 'warning'. These are learned language behaviours which hark back to more primal times yet can be viewed as causal to those who understand the verbal cues. First, what you're describing isn't causality. If A is causal to B, then B can't not follow A. B is a physical inevitability when we're talking about causality. Re your example, both meaning and understanding (which hinges on meaning) are subjective. These are important facts to keep in mind when we talk about concepts like "'full' understanding," which was an issue in another discussion we were recently having. It's possible to ascribe meaning to an utterance, and to be in a state of understanding with respect to that utterance, without reacting in a (just one) predictable way to that utterance. That means that the speech in question isn't causal to a particular reaction. Something else is.
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Post by goz on Jun 26, 2018 23:59:05 GMT
I am far from an expert, however I have studied both anthropology and psychology at a tertiary level as well as English. Consider this: At a mammalian level (and probably before) vocalisation as a warning has evolved in evolution to protect the species. It is most definitely 'causal' in the sense that the reason for the vocalisation is as an audible warning of danger to others in the species. This applies to speech as a communicator in humans. Hence the vocal cues have developed in human speech with certain sounds communicating as warnings. Such words as 'fire' can be considered such a verbal cure. There is also the issue of tonal differences and volume to account for such a verbal message to be accepted by a group as a 'warning'. These are learned language behaviours which hark back to more primal times yet can be viewed as causal to those who understand the verbal cues. First, what you're describing isn't causality. If A is causal to B, then B can't not follow A. B is a physical inevitability when we're talking about causality. Re your example, both meaning and understanding (which hinges on meaning) are subjective. These are important facts to keep in mind when we talk about concepts like "'full' understanding," which was an issue in another discussion we were recently having. It's possible to ascribe meaning to an utterance, and to be in a state of understanding with respect to that utterance, without reacting in a (just one) predictable way to that utterance. That means that the speech isn't causal to a particular reaction. Something else is. OK, I get that distinction, however we could think of a better word than 'causal' which encompasses the acquired meaning of communications as you state in your second para. This is what verbal communication hinges upon, and as I stated, this subjective shared knowledge has been an evolutionary advantage.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 27, 2018 0:06:16 GMT
First, what you're describing isn't causality. If A is causal to B, then B can't not follow A. B is a physical inevitability when we're talking about causality. Re your example, both meaning and understanding (which hinges on meaning) are subjective. These are important facts to keep in mind when we talk about concepts like "'full' understanding," which was an issue in another discussion we were recently having. It's possible to ascribe meaning to an utterance, and to be in a state of understanding with respect to that utterance, without reacting in a (just one) predictable way to that utterance. That means that the speech isn't causal to a particular reaction. Something else is. OK, I get that distinction, however we could think of a better word than 'causal' which encompasses the acquired meaning of communications as you state in your second para. This is what verbal communication hinges upon, and as I stated, this subjective shared knowledge has been an evolutionary advantage. We can't actually know that any two people have similar meanings of understandings in mind for anything. Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else. The thing is that it doesn't actually matter if people have similar meanings in mind for anything. What we care about for practical purposes is observable behavior, not internal, mental states (of others) that we can't access. (This is all very anti-Wittgenstein, or course . . . hence a big reason why I'm not a Wittgenstein fan.)
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Post by goz on Jun 27, 2018 0:23:32 GMT
OK, I get that distinction, however we could think of a better word than 'causal' which encompasses the acquired meaning of communications as you state in your second para. This is what verbal communication hinges upon, and as I stated, this subjective shared knowledge has been an evolutionary advantage. We can't actually know that any two people have similar meanings of understandings in mind for anything. Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else. The thing is that it doesn't actually matter if people have similar meanings in mind for anything. What we care about for practical purposes is observable behavior, not internal, mental states (of others) that we can't access. (This is all very anti-Wittgenstein, or course . . . hence a big reason why I'm not a Wittgenstein fan.) OK, so far so good. However, within communities, children are socialised to have a certain degree of commonality of meaning, as this is the actual point of 'language', so I don't think you can claim that having common meanings doesn't matter. It just doesn't matter what they are...which explains different languages.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 27, 2018 0:27:52 GMT
However, within communities, children are socialised to have a certain degree of commonality of meaning, How could we know whether that's the case?
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Post by goz on Jun 27, 2018 0:31:55 GMT
However, within communities, children are socialised to have a certain degree of commonality of meaning, How could we know whether that's the case? They do when they understand each other. It is called a 'language', and it is observable. It is also possible to learn another 'language' and communicate with a different group of people. What is your point here?
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 27, 2018 0:35:36 GMT
How could we know whether that's the case? They do when they understand each other. It is called a 'language', and it is observable. It is also possible to learn another 'language' and communicate with a different group of people. What is your point here? My point is that I don't agree with you, and I'm not sure you really understand (speaking of understanding) what I'm claiming. How would you say it's observable?
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Post by goz on Jun 27, 2018 0:52:01 GMT
They do when they understand each other. It is called a 'language', and it is observable. It is also possible to learn another 'language' and communicate with a different group of people. What is your point here? My point is that I don't agree with you, and I'm not sure you really understand (speaking of understanding) what I'm claiming. How would you say it's observable? WTF are you claiming? I asked you before what you point was. You are being pedantic and abstruse again, just for the sake of it.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 27, 2018 0:58:30 GMT
My point is that I don't agree with you, and I'm not sure you really understand (speaking of understanding) what I'm claiming. How would you say it's observable? WTF are you claiming? I asked you before what you point was. You are being pedantic and abstruse again, just for the sake of it. First, that speech isn't causal. And then we got into meaning, understanding, etc. Re my point there, I wrote all of that out very plainly: "We can't actually know that any two people have similar meanings of understandings in mind for anything. Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else. "The thing is that it doesn't actually matter if people have similar meanings in mind for anything. What we care about for practical purposes is observable behavior, not internal, mental states (of others) that we can't access. (This is all very anti-Wittgenstein, or course . . . hence a big reason why I'm not a Wittgenstein fan.)" Then you claimed common/shared meanings again, and I'm challenging the claim that we can know that there are any common or shared meanings. So I asked you to support how we could know this.
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Post by goz on Jun 27, 2018 1:15:25 GMT
WTF are you claiming? I asked you before what you point was. You are being pedantic and abstruse again, just for the sake of it. First, that speech isn't causal. And then we got into meaning, understanding, etc. Re my point there, I wrote all of that our very plainly: "We can't actually know that any two people have similar meanings of understandings in mind for anything. Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else. "The thing is that it doesn't actually matter if people have similar meanings in mind for anything. What we care about for practical purposes is observable behavior, not internal, mental states (of others) that we can't access. (This is all very anti-Wittgenstein, or course . . . hence a big reason why I'm not a Wittgenstein fan.)" Then you claimed common/shared meanings again, and I'm challenging the claim that we can know that there are any common or shared meanings. So I asked you to support how we could know this. The evidence of shared meaning is observable as I said, as it is the whole point of language. A small child learns words which have a common shared meaning with its parents, usually for shared experiences and basic needs and builds on that. If you have ever had children, you will know that babies understand much more of verbal language than they can annunciate and are busy soaking up pre-language, understanding the verbal cues of their parents. I would have thought this was obvious. BOTH a mother and a baby will have a shared experience of a word for food/feeding whether it is bottle breast milk etc etc etc in any language, just as an example, and even very young babies follow simple verbal commands thus exhibiting a shared meaning for verbal cues that is observable and demonstrable It doesn't matter what that actual word is. Again, what abstruse point are you attempting to make?
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 27, 2018 1:19:35 GMT
First, that speech isn't causal. And then we got into meaning, understanding, etc. Re my point there, I wrote all of that our very plainly: "We can't actually know that any two people have similar meanings of understandings in mind for anything. Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else. "The thing is that it doesn't actually matter if people have similar meanings in mind for anything. What we care about for practical purposes is observable behavior, not internal, mental states (of others) that we can't access. (This is all very anti-Wittgenstein, or course . . . hence a big reason why I'm not a Wittgenstein fan.)" Then you claimed common/shared meanings again, and I'm challenging the claim that we can know that there are any common or shared meanings. So I asked you to support how we could know this. The evidence of shared meaning is observable as I said, as it is the whole point of language. A small child learns words which have a common shared meaning with its parents, usually for shared experiences and basic needs and builds on that. If you have ever had children, you will know that babies understand much more of verbal language than they can annunciate and are busy soaking up pre-language, understanding the verbal cues of their parents. I would have thought this was obvious. BOTH a mother and a baby will have a shared experience of a word for food/feeding whether it is bottle breast milk etc etc etc in any language, just as an example, and even very young babies follow simple verbal commands thus exhibiting a shared meaning for verbal cues that is observable and demonstrable It doesn't matter what that actual word is. Again, what abstruse point are you attempting to make? You're talking about utterances and observable behavior there, no? But I just wrote that " Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else." So how do utterances and observable behavior tell us anything about meanings?
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Post by goz on Jun 27, 2018 1:28:05 GMT
The evidence of shared meaning is observable as I said, as it is the whole point of language. A small child learns words which have a common shared meaning with its parents, usually for shared experiences and basic needs and builds on that. If you have ever had children, you will know that babies understand much more of verbal language than they can annunciate and are busy soaking up pre-language, understanding the verbal cues of their parents. I would have thought this was obvious. BOTH a mother and a baby will have a shared experience of a word for food/feeding whether it is bottle breast milk etc etc etc in any language, just as an example, and even very young babies follow simple verbal commands thus exhibiting a shared meaning for verbal cues that is observable and demonstrable It doesn't matter what that actual word is. Again, what abstruse point are you attempting to make? You're talking about utterances and observable behavior there, no? But I just wrote that " Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else." So how do utterances and observable behavior tell us anything about meanings? How many meanings can a banana have?
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 27, 2018 1:32:41 GMT
You're talking about utterances and observable behavior there, no? But I just wrote that " Meanings aren't the same thing as utterances or observable behavior. Meanings are mental phenomena that can't somehow be turned into something else." So how do utterances and observable behavior tell us anything about meanings? How many meanings can a banana have? How many meanings can individual persons assign to the object? There's no way to count that, since no one can share the meanings they assign, but, even with nominalistic concerns aside, surely any object, such as a banana, could have potentially billions and billions of meanings.
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