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Post by phludowin on Feb 10, 2018 9:40:50 GMT
The belief that there is objective morality makes as much sense to me as the belief that the World Trade Center never existed, and that the events from 9/11 were an elaborate hoax to distract from the fact that the Earth is flat.
Meaning: No sense at all.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 10, 2018 9:51:02 GMT
I don't think that's what the article/studies are doing. I think they're just taking certain actions for which there is wide agreement on their classification as "moral" and studying whether or not the religious take these actions more so than atheists. The article doesn't address the issue of what morality is, it just assumes that most would classify the actions as moral; I don't see where it's suggesting (beyond the aforementioned assumption) that those actions are "moral period." "Most would classify these particular things as moral" is promoting a misconception of what morality is. Morality isn't any particular stances. If you're just going to ask if atheists are more or less likely to agree with particular stances, you need to spell out the stances. And then you can survey atheists to see what they say, and you can also survey predictions about what atheists would or wouldn't agree with, and then see just how accurate those predictions are. You'd have to elaborate on the first part just to make sure we don't get tripped up over semantics. As for the second, atheists agreeing/disagreeing with stances isn't the focus of those studies; they're more about seeing whether religious beliefs (or a lack of them) are correlated with the kinds of actions those beliefs promote (as in the Good Samaritan study). Whether we call those actions moral or not isn't terribly relevant.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 10, 2018 9:56:08 GMT
The belief that there is objective morality makes as much sense to me as the belief that the World Trade Center never existed, and that the events from 9/11 were an elaborate hoax to distract from the fact that the Earth is flat. Meaning: No sense at all. I understand why the belief makes sense to many: because they mistake their strong intuitions for truth factories. Plus, morality (especially shared morality) is really important and it makes people more comfortable to think something so important isn't subject to the variability of human feelings, but is as real and unchanging as the sun and moon.
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Post by phludowin on Feb 10, 2018 10:00:58 GMT
The belief that there is objective morality makes as much sense to me as the belief that the World Trade Center never existed, and that the events from 9/11 were an elaborate hoax to distract from the fact that the Earth is flat. Meaning: No sense at all. I understand why the belief makes sense to many: because they mistake their strong intuitions for truth factories. Plus, morality (especially shared morality) is really important and it makes people more comfortable to think something so important isn't subject to the variability of human feelings, but is as real and unchanging as the sun and moon. Valid points. But the Sun and the Moon are not unchanging. And neither are human codes of morality.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 10:15:56 GMT
"Most would classify these particular things as moral" is promoting a misconception of what morality is. Morality isn't any particular stances. If you're just going to ask if atheists are more or less likely to agree with particular stances, you need to spell out the stances. And then you can survey atheists to see what they say, and you can also survey predictions about what atheists would or wouldn't agree with, and then see just how accurate those predictions are. You'd have to elaborate on the first part just to make sure we don't get tripped up over semantics. As for the second, atheists agreeing/disagreeing with stances isn't the focus of those studies; they're more about seeing whether religious beliefs (or a lack of them) are correlated with the kinds of actions those beliefs promote (as in the Good Samaritan study). Whether we call those actions moral or not isn't terribly relevant. We hardly need a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with religious beliefs, religious tenets, etc.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 10, 2018 10:27:44 GMT
I understand why the belief makes sense to many: because they mistake their strong intuitions for truth factories. Plus, morality (especially shared morality) is really important and it makes people more comfortable to think something so important isn't subject to the variability of human feelings, but is as real and unchanging as the sun and moon. Valid points. But the Sun and the Moon are not unchanging. And neither are human codes of morality. Indeed, but they appear not to be.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 10, 2018 10:35:50 GMT
You'd have to elaborate on the first part just to make sure we don't get tripped up over semantics. As for the second, atheists agreeing/disagreeing with stances isn't the focus of those studies; they're more about seeing whether religious beliefs (or a lack of them) are correlated with the kinds of actions those beliefs promote (as in the Good Samaritan study). Whether we call those actions moral or not isn't terribly relevant. We hardly need a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with religious beliefs, religious tenets, etc. I do think you'd need studies to find out how much religiosity correlated with an action like helping others (which isn't uniquely religious, but is a common action religion promotes).
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Post by Isapop on Feb 10, 2018 10:48:37 GMT
You'd have to elaborate on the first part just to make sure we don't get tripped up over semantics. As for the second, atheists agreeing/disagreeing with stances isn't the focus of those studies; they're more about seeing whether religious beliefs (or a lack of them) are correlated with the kinds of actions those beliefs promote (as in the Good Samaritan study). Whether we call those actions moral or not isn't terribly relevant. We hardly need a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with religious beliefs, religious tenets, etc. But there may be use in a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with behaviors I mentioned (act honestly, don't act harmfully) - behaviors that many refer to as "morality", but that we don't have to call morality to still make the study. (I see I'm seconding Eva here.)
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Post by Deleted on Feb 10, 2018 11:46:10 GMT
I can't speak for all atheists--I'm sure many atheists believe that morality is objective and "'baked' into the fabric of reality" without the need for God to do it Yeah, why couldn't morality just be a natural property of actions, the way colour and density is a property of physical objects? The first premise of the moral argument, "If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist" is pure assumption with absolutely nothing to back it up. This is really going to hinge on what you mean by "objective". I'd argue that evolution has programmed the human race to have certain baseline truths; suffering and pain is bad, pleasure and joy is good. There are exceptions even to that - sadists and masochists. But as a general rule they do hold. We also have a built in empathy for the emotions of other people - though again, that doesn't hold 100% as there are sociopaths and psychopaths, and even normal people empathise with those physically and emotionally close to them much more than they do with strangers. Indeed, as an aside I'd argue that the history of civilisation has been one of gradually extending the "us" group wider and wider. Anyway, the point is that these things are not simply arbitrary. It's not like a person just happens to wake up one morning and thinks "You know what? I think I'll consider pain bad from now on." Or "Hey, when I see somebody else badly hurt, I think I will choose to be upset about it." These things are deeply programmed into most people, for rather obvious evolutionary reasons. And I'd also argue that morality primarily stems from this; morality is about creating codes of behaviour that accord with our programmed instincts and which allow us to live together in a society. So the basis of morality does have an objective basis - not in the sense that it's baked into the universe, but rather that its baked into us as human beings. But there's also a TON of subjective interpretation built on top of that. What we would expect in the above model is that there are going to be some virtually universal moral precepts - don't murder, don't abuse children - but great variation in how they are applied and what the exact rules should be. And the further away you get from the basics, the more disagreement there will be. So for example we shouldn't kill one another - but what about self defence, what about capital punishment, what about abortion, what about war? And that's exactly what we do see happening. If morals were objective unalterable rules baked into the universe, then why is there all that disagreement? How can any two people possibly disagree on a fundamental moral principle? Look around you; does the world really look like there is universal agreement on all moral points? Of course not. The analogy I like to use is that morality is like diet. Which diet is best for you depends on what it is you're trying to achieve - a bodybuilder needs a different diet to a teacher, a child needs a different diet to an astronaut, a diabetic needs a different diet still. Yet there are objective facts about dieting; eating nothing but salt is bad for your health as an objective fact. Claiming that morality has to be an objective part of the structure of the universe or else it's useless, makes as much sense to me as claiming that "don't eat fatty food" must be an inherent part of the universe or else people can just eat anything without consequences. Agreed, but again with the caveat that how people feel about stuff is not entirely arbitrary.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 12:01:57 GMT
We hardly need a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with religious beliefs, religious tenets, etc. I do think you'd need studies to find out how much religiosity correlated with an action like helping others (which isn't uniquely religious, but is a common action religion promotes). Okay, so first, if we're saying that we're looking at "It's morally good to help others," as opposed to "it's morally good to not help others" (or any other option than simply "it's morally good to help others") then we need to actually specify that in an academic study, no? We can't just talk about "being moral" with an assumption that "it's morally good to help others" is what we're talking about, because that's not what morality is, and we'd be promoting a misconception of what morality is--and in an academic study no less--by doing that. We also can't just assume that people know this by mentioning religion. What religion(s) are we talking about? What are its tenets? (We need to specify that so that our assumptions can be looked at critically), etc.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 12:13:02 GMT
I can't speak for all atheists--I'm sure many atheists believe that morality is objective and "'baked' into the fabric of reality" without the need for God to do it Yeah, why couldn't morality just be a natural property of actions, the way colour and density is a property of physical objects? It's a natural property of the way that brains work, so it is a natural property of physical objects. That it's a property of brains is what makes it subjective, and what makes it the case that everyone has it, everyone is moral per their own judgments (and not per some other persons' judgments), even if they believe they should be murdering other people.
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Post by cupcakes on Feb 10, 2018 12:42:42 GMT
tpfkar I do think you'd need studies to find out how much religiosity correlated with an action like helping others (which isn't uniquely religious, but is a common action religion promotes). Okay, so first, if we're saying that we're looking at "It's morally good to help others," as opposed to "it's morally good to not help others" (or any other option than simply "it's morally good to help others") then we need to actually specify that in an academic study, no? We can't just talk about "being moral" with an assumption that "it's morally good to help others" is what we're talking about, because that's not what morality is, and we'd be promoting a misconception of what morality is--and in an academic study no less--by doing that. We also can't just assume that people know this by mentioning religion. What religion(s) are we talking about? What are its tenets? (We need to specify that so that our assumptions can be looked at critically), etc. Did you read the study? Did they not qualify what "being more moral" meant in terms of it? Do you think it would be more likely for an article to delineate it explicitly if the study was using something contrary to how just about everybody uses it? Police Encounters
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 12:57:38 GMT
tpfkar Okay, so first, if we're saying that we're looking at "It's morally good to help others," as opposed to "it's morally good to not help others" (or any other option than simply "it's morally good to help others") then we need to actually specify that in an academic study, no? We can't just talk about "being moral" with an assumption that "it's morally good to help others" is what we're talking about, because that's not what morality is, and we'd be promoting a misconception of what morality is--and in an academic study no less--by doing that. We also can't just assume that people know this by mentioning religion. What religion(s) are we talking about? What are its tenets? (We need to specify that so that our assumptions can be looked at critically), etc. Did you read the study? Did they not qualify what "being more moral" meant in terms of it? Do you think it would be more likely for an article to delineate it explicitly if the study was using something contrary to how just about everybody uses it? Police EncountersI skimmed over it at least, but I don't want to spend hours going over it with a fine-toothed comb to argue with "cupcakes" on the Internet, especially when "cupcakes" just wants to argue with me no matter what.
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Post by cupcakes on Feb 10, 2018 13:04:57 GMT
tpfkar Did you read the study? Did they not qualify what "being more moral" meant in terms of it? Do you think it would be more likely for an article to delineate it explicitly if the study was using something contrary to how just about everybody uses it? Police EncountersI skimmed over it at least, but I don't want to spend hours going over it with a fine-toothed comb to argue with "cupcakes" on the Internet, especially when "cupcakes" just wants to argue with me no matter what. Is "whine" your middle name "Turtle"? You do seem to be able to consistently post the most obtuse shyte with or without reading, which I do like responding to. As with everything else, slavery being bad is not a fact. Whether it's good or bad is about the feelings of the person making the assessment. Slavery is good to anyone who feels positively about it. That's not the sort of thing one can be wrong about.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 13:51:41 GMT
We hardly need a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with religious beliefs, religious tenets, etc. But there may be use in a study to see whether religious believers versus non believers are more likely to act in accord with behaviors I mentioned (act honestly, don't act harmfully) - behaviors that many refer to as "morality", but that we don't have to call morality to still make the study. (I see I'm seconding Eva here.)
Sure (at least ignoring that something like "don't act harmfully" isn't at all well-defined), but I still have a problem with the irresponsibility and/or ignorance of promoting a misconception of what morality is.
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Post by Isapop on Feb 10, 2018 13:56:26 GMT
everyone is moral per their own judgments (and not per some other persons' judgments), even if they believe they should be murdering other people. If we describe morality (as I would) as "rules that serve our common preference to live and flourish", then rules that can be shown, through logic and evidence, to actually serve that preference qualify to be called "moral". Like the rule, "Don't murder". That's why there's no equivalency between a morality that forbids murder and a morality that approves murder. The former satisfies the objective test of logic and empirical evidence of serving our common preference, but the latter does not.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 14:00:30 GMT
everyone is moral per their own judgments (and not per some other persons' judgments), even if they believe they should be murdering other people. If we describe morality (as I would) as "rules that serve our common preference to live and flourish", then rules that can be shown, through logic and evidence, to actually serve that preference qualify to be called "moral". Like the rule, "Don't murder". That's why there's no equivalency between a morality that forbids murder and a morality that approves murder. The former satisfies the objective test of logic and empirical evidence of serving our common preference, but the latter does not.
If you describe morality that way, then you don't understand what morality is, and you're at least implicitly trying to sneak an argumentum ad populum in (re "common preference" being the determiner)
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 10, 2018 14:10:13 GMT
everyone is moral per their own judgments (and not per some other persons' judgments), even if they believe they should be murdering other people. If we describe morality (as I would) as "rules that serve our common preference to live and flourish", then rules that can be shown, through logic and evidence, to actually serve that preference qualify to be called "moral". Like the rule, "Don't murder". That's why there's no equivalency between a morality that forbids murder and a morality that approves murder. The former satisfies the objective test of logic and empirical evidence of serving our common preference, but the latter does not.
Something else you'd be doing, by the way, that is severely in error, is assuming that everyone uses "I have a preference to live and flourish" as a moral ground. But that's not at all the case, even if you were to ask people if they have such a preference and they were to agree. Agreeing with that doesn't imply that they're ethical foundationalists with that as their foundation. You can't just "read it into them" as their foundation because it makes sense to you or because it's your foundation or because you like it.
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Post by Isapop on Feb 10, 2018 14:11:56 GMT
If we describe morality (as I would) as "rules that serve our common preference to live and flourish", then rules that can be shown, through logic and evidence, to actually serve that preference qualify to be called "moral". Like the rule, "Don't murder". That's why there's no equivalency between a morality that forbids murder and a morality that approves murder. The former satisfies the objective test of logic and empirical evidence of serving our common preference, but the latter does not.
If you describe morality that way, then you don't understand what morality is, and you're at least implicitly trying to sneak an argumentum ad populum in (re "common preference" being the determiner) My description is the reason that I think it's wrong to murder. What would you call that if not "morality"? And what is it that YOU call "morality"?
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Post by Isapop on Feb 10, 2018 14:18:04 GMT
If we describe morality (as I would) as "rules that serve our common preference to live and flourish", then rules that can be shown, through logic and evidence, to actually serve that preference qualify to be called "moral". Like the rule, "Don't murder". That's why there's no equivalency between a morality that forbids murder and a morality that approves murder. The former satisfies the objective test of logic and empirical evidence of serving our common preference, but the latter does not.
Something else you'd be doing, by the way, that is severely in error, is assuming that everyone uses "I have a preference to live and flourish" as a moral ground. But that's not at all the case, even if you were to ask people if they have such a preference and they were to agree. Agreeing with that doesn't imply that they're ethical foundationalists with that as their foundation. You can't just "read it into them" as their foundation because it makes sense to you or because it's your foundation or because you like it. From our previous exchange, I already stipulated that the preference to live and flourish is (as you would argue) arbitrary. It may not have an ethical foundation, but (unlike other arbitrary preferences) it is instinctive and for all intents and purposes universal. That makes it valid guide in devising "moral" laws.
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