The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 18, 2018 20:30:35 GMT
First, it's nice to see you back on the board Kiera! Thanks though not sure I'll be back for any length of time. I don't think this applies. If Bigfoot existed you might expect to find evidence of him. But what evidence of goodness could you expect if such a thing existed? You could of course take a logical positivist stance and say anything that would not produce evidence should not be part of our ontology but that doesn't strike me as the stance Goz is taking - if she were then the disagreement about moral viewpoints is irrelevant to this argument. Conditional oughts can be objective eg if I want to win the race I ought to run fast. So if there were a hypothetical ontological goodness (putting aside what that might be for the time being) one could say if you wish to be good, you ought to do X. Wishing to be good, would still be up to the subject but good actions themselves would not be. At any rate, again this seems a very different argument from Goz's which is that diversity in moral opinion implies there are no moral facts. It's this I was taking exception to, not the denial of moral facts per se.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 18, 2018 20:39:44 GMT
People who are objective universalists CLAIM moral fact. Ok but one can claim moral fact and be wrong. So if two people claim a contradictory moral fact, at least one of them is wrong but that doesn't mean there is no moral fact. ..unless they are both wrong because there is no such thing, just opinion. There is no moral fact that there either is or isn't a moral fact. Nonsense.
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 18, 2018 20:40:27 GMT
Yes. The fact that they both think that they are right and that both could both be wrong or right in the sense that they perceive it...ergo there is no objective ultimate universal right and wrong. History proves this nicely. So does the fact that there are different religions where even the ultimate 'moral wrong' of killing, has been optional since time immemorial and just look at the Christian society of the USA and the death penalty. You have to go no further. What does that prove? That there are no objective morals or that Christians disagree as to what they are?
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 18, 2018 20:45:00 GMT
.unless they are both wrong because there is no such thing, just opinion. Quite plausible. But their disagreement in itself does not imply this. If X exist, people can disagree about the nature of X. If X doesn't exist, people can disagree about the nature of X. Disagreement can happen either way and so doesn't indicate whether X does or does not exist.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 18, 2018 21:49:21 GMT
.unless they are both wrong because there is no such thing, just opinion. Quite plausible. But their disagreement in itself does not imply this. If X exist, people can disagree about the nature of X. If X doesn't exist, people can disagree about the nature of X. Disagreement can happen either way and so doesn't indicate whether X does or does not exist. OK, We are getting nowhere. What do you see as an objective morality if you claim that there is such a thing?
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 18, 2018 22:29:04 GMT
What do you see as an objective morality if you claim that there is such a thing? I don't actually claim that there is such a thing. My reason for endorsing assuming moral facts exist is not that I think it likely that they do (actually it's probably more likely they do not) it's that any moral question seems to take universality for granted. When we ask what is the right thing to do, we presume that there is a right thing to do and that this is a different standard from what I want to do. We also would appeal to this same standard when questioning whether others have acted morally. So morality seems to imply universality. To put it another way, even if there are no moral facts, we presume there are whenever we question what is moral. And in truth, there is no difference in practice between thinking one's morals reflect a moral fact as opposed to how one feels. You only need to see the moral debates on these boards to see the moral subjectivist and objectivists hold their stances just as firmly. And if moral facts don't exist, no moral position has any truth value anyway so why care whether the proponent of a moral thinks it reflects a fact or not? Their stance is just as nonsensical either way. Now a fallacy people sometimes fall foul of is that it is better to endorse moral subjectivism rather than objectivism because the subjectivist is more likely to tolerate other viewpoints. While that might be true (though I'm not sure it is - do you find that you are tolerant of supporting slavery for instance?), to argue that this is better would be to presume some special moral fact that tolerance is better than non-tolerance. As for what moral facts should be endorsed, I think Kant has come the closest to the correct formulation since it relies only that we accept universality which I think is a given when we question what is the right thing to do: "Act according to the maxim that you would wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law." So to me it's a toss-up between Kant's formulation or just dismissing morality altogether as a nonsense. I find the latter impossible in practice so I go with the former.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 18, 2018 23:02:52 GMT
What do you see as an objective morality if you claim that there is such a thing? I don't actually claim that there is such a thing. My reason for endorsing assuming moral facts exist is not that I think it likely that they do (actually it's probably more likely they do not) it's that any moral question seems to take universality for granted. When we ask what is the right thing to do, we presume that there is a right thing to do and that this is a different standard from what I want to do. We also would appeal to this same standard when questioning whether others have acted morally. So morality seems to imply universality. To put it another way, even if there are no moral facts, we presume there are whenever we question what is moral. And in truth, there is no difference in practice between thinking one's morals reflect a moral fact as opposed to how one feels. You only need to see the moral debates on these boards to see the moral subjectivist and objectivists hold their stances just as firmly. And if moral facts don't exist, no moral position has any truth value anyway so why care whether the a proponent of a moral thinks it reflects a fact or not? Their stance is just as nonsensical either way. Now a fallacy people sometimes fall foul of is that it is better to endorse moral subjectivism rather than objectivism because the subjectivist is more likely to tolerate other viewpoints. While that might be true (though I'm not sure it is - do you find that you are tolerant of slavery for instance?), to argue that this is better would be to presume some special moral fact that tolerance is better than non-tolerance. As for what moral facts should be endorsed, I think Kant has come the closest to the correct formulation since it relies only that we accept universality which I think is a given when we question what is the right thing to do: "Act according to the maxim that you would wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law." So to me it's a toss-up between Kant's formulation or just dismissing morality altogether as a nonsense. I find the latter impossible in practice so I go with the former. Nope, sorry, I still don't get the difference you are manufacturing between 'moral facts' and objective morality. Even in your terms, there are NO absolute moral facts, there is only subjective opinions as to what is the best course of action under particular circumstances or conditions, and Kant says it rather well. Note he claims 'as if' not that a universal law exists.
|
|
|
Post by phludowin on Feb 18, 2018 23:05:55 GMT
As for what moral facts should be endorsed, I think Kant has come the closest to the correct formulation since it relies only that we accept universality which I think is a given when we question what is the right thing to do: "Act according to the maxim that you would wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law." So to me it's a toss-up between Kant's formulation or just dismissing morality altogether as a nonsense. I find the latter impossible in practice so I go with the former. Kant's categorical imperative is subjective, and therefore no evidence for objective morality. In fact, it's evidence against it. Reasons: Different people have different maximes. And yet it's possible for them to coexist. In your formulation, Kant restricts his categorical imperative to rational people. Most entities in the Universe are not rational, therefore, it doesn't apply to them. And yet, the Universe exists. So Kant's categorical imperative is not universally valid.
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 18, 2018 23:24:40 GMT
Nope, sorry, I still don't get the difference you are manufacturing between 'moral facts' and objective morality. I didn't say there was a difference. A moral objectivist takes the stance there are moral facts independent of opinions. I think we are both using terms like moral facts, objectivism, subjectivism and universalism a bit loosely which is probably adding to our inability to make much progress here. Yes there are subjective opinions as to what is best, but the objectivist thinks not all opinions are equally valid. No that's not what he is saying. He's saying we should only act in a certain manner if we could logically wish everyone to act in such a manner in the same situation. So if I were to universalise the maximum that everyone would rob a bank when they were short on money, the whole banking system would collapse therefore I couldn't rely on it to get money so I couldn't logically universalise that. He's essentially saying "what if everyone did that" and if you wouldn't want to live in a world where everyone did that them you shouldn't do it. The reason he says "act as if" is because he knows on reality not everyone would follow that maxim but that in itself is irrelevant to implying the imperative - eg it would still be wrong for me to kill a man for his money because I would not want to live in a world where everyone did that even though me killing a man for his money would not create such a world in reality. And he thought this categorical imperative should be applied in all moral questions so he believed it universal. As to whether it actually exists as a fact of the universe, he was essentially agnostic but he argued we should take it on faith that it does or else ethics as a whole becomes a nonsense. So that's roughly my stance too.
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 18, 2018 23:34:23 GMT
As for what moral facts should be endorsed, I think Kant has come the closest to the correct formulation since it relies only that we accept universality which I think is a given when we question what is the right thing to do: "Act according to the maxim that you would wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law." So to me it's a toss-up between Kant's formulation or just dismissing morality altogether as a nonsense. I find the latter impossible in practice so I go with the former. Kant's categorical imperative is subjective, and therefore no evidence for objective morality. In fact, it's evidence against it. Reasons: Different people have different maximes. And yet it's possible for them to coexist. This would only be a valid reason if there were a logical contradiction caused by having two different moral stances but there is only a contradiction if these conflicting stances were both true. If I maintain that the categorical imperative is true and utilitarianism (for example) is false then there is no contradiction there. This seems a bit of a pedantic point. Yes, the categorical imperative is universal only amongst rational agents. I don't think any moral universalist is arguing pebbles should behave ethically. But yes if you object to "universal" being used to apply to only a set within the universe rather than the whole universe then fair enough, use another term.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 19, 2018 1:07:59 GMT
Nope, sorry, I still don't get the difference you are manufacturing between 'moral facts' and objective morality. I didn't say there was a difference. A moral objectivist takes the stance there are moral facts independent of opinions. I think we are both using terms like moral facts, objectivism, subjectivism and universalism a bit loosely which is probably adding to our inability to make much progress here. Yes there are subjective opinions as to what is best, but the objectivist thinks not all opinions are equally valid. No that's not what he is saying. He's saying we should only act in a certain manner if we could logically wish everyone to act in such a manner in the same situation. So if I were to universalise the maximum that everyone would rob a bank when they were short on money, the whole banking system would collapse therefore I couldn't rely on it to get money so I couldn't logically universalise that. He's essentially saying "what if everyone did that" and if you wouldn't want to live in a world where everyone did that them you shouldn't do it. The reason he says "act as if" is because he knows on reality not everyone would follow that maxim but that in itself is irrelevant to implying the imperative - eg it would still be wrong for me to kill a man for his money because I would not want to live in a world where everyone did that even though me killing a man for his money would not create such a world in reality. And he thought this categorical imperative should be applied in all moral questions so he believed it universal. As to whether it actually exists as a fact of the universe, he was essentially agnostic but he argued we should take it on faith that it does or else ethics as a whole becomes a nonsense. So that's roughly my stance too. You are complicating this unnecessarily. There is either a universal truth/morality or there isn't. I say there isn't. You? and why? With this whole Kant red herring, you seem to be proposing a least harm approach as opposed to concrete and absolute invariable truths. Let's apply this to the most universal I can think of. 'Thou shalt not kill'. Can one apply that to EVERY situation? Historically it hasn't been so, even amongst the most fervent religious groups who otherwise claim a universal morality.
|
|
|
Post by CoolJGS☺ on Feb 19, 2018 1:14:26 GMT
Not killing someone is not a universal anything.
Maybe if family is attached to the rule.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 19, 2018 1:19:25 GMT
Not killing someone is not a universal anything. Maybe if family is attached to the rule. Hey! I am returning the compliment by saying that you are making a couple of grand pronouncements without any explanation. I agree that not killing someone is not universal...that was my point. What do you mean in the second sentence!
|
|
|
Post by CoolJGS☺ on Feb 19, 2018 1:23:46 GMT
Not killing someone is not a universal anything. Maybe if family is attached to the rule. Hey! I am returning the compliment by saying that you are making a couple of grand pronouncements without any explanation. I agree that not killing someone is not universal...that was my point. What do you mean in the second sentence! I didn't quote you. However, you are still conflating some things which makes. So while your statement correct to some extent, the blaming of religions not getting it incorrect and I can only assume you will say that there's a million interpretations for that even though there's not. Further, it may be that you chose a universal moral code that isn't actually one while something like infanticide is a more accurate universal moral code.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 19, 2018 1:35:20 GMT
Hey! I am returning the compliment by saying that you are making a couple of grand pronouncements without any explanation. I agree that not killing someone is not universal...that was my point. What do you mean in the second sentence! I didn't quote you. However, you are still conflating some things which makes. So while your statement correct to some extent, the blaming of religions not getting it incorrect and I can only assume you will say that there's a million interpretations for that even though there's not. Further, it may be that you chose a universal moral code that isn't actually one while something like infanticide is a more accurate universal moral code. EXCUSE ME! Because you didn't quote me, does that mean I am unable to answer you, when we are involved in the same discussion ? I hope you are editing this as it in not making sense. So universalists can claim that an objective moral code applies to killing infants butt not killing children or adults? Is it Miller time?
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 1:35:52 GMT
I didn't say there was a difference. A moral objectivist takes the stance there are moral facts independent of opinions. I think we are both using terms like moral facts, objectivism, subjectivism and universalism a bit loosely which is probably adding to our inability to make much progress here. Yes there are subjective opinions as to what is best, but the objectivist thinks not all opinions are equally valid. No that's not what he is saying. He's saying we should only act in a certain manner if we could logically wish everyone to act in such a manner in the same situation. So if I were to universalise the maximum that everyone would rob a bank when they were short on money, the whole banking system would collapse therefore I couldn't rely on it to get money so I couldn't logically universalise that. He's essentially saying "what if everyone did that" and if you wouldn't want to live in a world where everyone did that them you shouldn't do it. The reason he says "act as if" is because he knows on reality not everyone would follow that maxim but that in itself is irrelevant to implying the imperative - eg it would still be wrong for me to kill a man for his money because I would not want to live in a world where everyone did that even though me killing a man for his money would not create such a world in reality. And he thought this categorical imperative should be applied in all moral questions so he believed it universal. As to whether it actually exists as a fact of the universe, he was essentially agnostic but he argued we should take it on faith that it does or else ethics as a whole becomes a nonsense. So that's roughly my stance too. You are complicating this unnecessarily. There is either a universal truth/morality or there isn't. I say there isn't. You? and why? With this whole Kant red herring, you seem to be proposing a least harm approach as opposed to concrete and absolute invariable truths. Let's apply this to the most universal I can think of. 'Thou shalt not kill'. Can one apply that to EVERY situation? Historically it hasn't been so, even amongst the most fervent religious groups who otherwise claim a universal morality. Ok I think the issue here is for you objective morality means adhering to a list of rigid rules and that's not quite correct. It means that there is such an objective thing as goodness and what is moral is what adheres to this goodness. So the least harm approach would assume that what is good is what causes least harm (incidentally the least harm stance is not my stance). Others may disagree on what actions and maxims adhere to goodness but they agree that there is such a thing as goodness. So some Christians think to be good we must never kill while others think we may kill in some circumstances. But they agree that there is a right answer even if at least one of them has it wrong. So that's the difference between objectivists and subjectivists - one side thinks there is a right answer when we ask what is moral and the other does not. That objectivists may differ on what they think the right answer is but that's neither here nor there.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 19, 2018 1:45:47 GMT
You are complicating this unnecessarily. There is either a universal truth/morality or there isn't. I say there isn't. You? and why? With this whole Kant red herring, you seem to be proposing a least harm approach as opposed to concrete and absolute invariable truths. Let's apply this to the most universal I can think of. 'Thou shalt not kill'. Can one apply that to EVERY situation? Historically it hasn't been so, even amongst the most fervent religious groups who otherwise claim a universal morality. Ok I think the issue here is for you objective morality means adhering to a list of rigid rules and that's not quite correct. It means that there is such an objective thing as goodness and what is moral is what adheres to this goodness. So the least harm approach would assume that what is good is what causes least harm (incidentally the least harm stance is not my stance). Others may disagree on what actions and maxims adhere to goodness but they agree that there is such a thing as goodness. So some Christians think to be good we must never kill while others think we may kill in some circumstances. But they agree that there is a right answer even if at least one of them has it wrong. So that's the difference between objectivists and subjectivists - one side thinks there is a right answer when we ask what is moral and the other does not. That objectivists may differ on what they think the right answer is but that's neither here nor there. How is there such an objective thing as goodness? 'Goodness is in the eye of the beholder', therefore it CANNOT be objective nor universal. I am sorry my dear, this argument is weak. You are essentially saying here that the 'right' answer of an objectivist is subjective. Contradiction in terms.
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 2:07:27 GMT
'Goodness is in the eye of the beholder', therefore it CANNOT be objective nor universal. But for the objectivist it's not in the eye of the beholder. That's the point. That's what makes them objectivists. Ok gonna try a last ditch analogy and if you still disagree with me then we shall agree to disagree. Suppose you and I see a woman who looks like she might be pregnant and we both think she is (though we cannot be sure). You say you think her baby will be blond, I say I think her baby will be brown haired. We are making 2 claims - that she is pregnant and the hair colour of her child. So any of the following could be true: 1. She is pregnant and the baby will be blond (ie we are both right that she's pregnant and you are right about the hair colour) 2. She is pregnant and the baby will be brown haired (ie we are both right that she is pregnant and I am right about the hair colour) 3. She is pregnant and the baby is neither blond nor brown haired (we are right that she is pregnant but neither of us is right about the hair colour) 4. She is not pregnant at all (is neither of us is right that she is pregnant and our speculation about the hair colour is meaningless). So too if I assert killing is objectively wrong I am making two claims - 1. there is an objective measure of goodness and 2. killing does not conform to it. So if I disagree with another objective moralist on whether killing is wrong, we still agree that there is some standard of morality. We could be wrong but the fact we disagree is irrelevant to this.
|
|
|
Post by goz on Feb 19, 2018 2:13:59 GMT
'Goodness is in the eye of the beholder', therefore it CANNOT be objective nor universal. But for the objectivist it's not in the eye of the beholder. That's the point. That's what makes them objectivists. Ok gonna try a last ditch analogy and if you still disagree with me then we shall agree to disagree. Suppose you and I see a woman who looks like she might be pregnant and we both think she is (though we cannot be sure). You say you think her baby will be blond, I say I think her baby will be brown haired. We are making 2 claims - that she is pregnant and the hair colour of her child. So any of the following could be true: 1. She is pregnant and the baby will be blond (ie we are both right that she's pregnant and you are right about the hair colour) 2. She is pregnant and the baby will be brown haired (ie we are both right that she is pregnant and I am right about the hair colour) 3. She is pregnant and the baby is neither blond nor brown haired (we are right that she is pregnant but neither of us is right about the hair colour) 4. She is not pregnant at all (is neither of us is right that she is pregnant and our speculation about the hair colour is meaningless). So too if I assert killing is objectively wrong I am making two claims - 1. there is an objective measure of goodness and 2. killing does not conform to it. So if I disagree with another objective moralist on whether killing is wrong, we still agree that there is some standard of morality. We could be wrong but the fact we disagree is irrelevant to this. Your analogy is not relevant because the options are only variants and not absolute truths. Objective moralists cannot disagree if there is only one objective truth. The fact you disagree is the whole point.
|
|
The Lost One
Junior Member
@lostkiera
Posts: 2,671
Likes: 1,296
|
Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 2:15:33 GMT
But for the objectivist it's not in the eye of the beholder. That's the point. That's what makes them objectivists. Ok gonna try a last ditch analogy and if you still disagree with me then we shall agree to disagree. Suppose you and I see a woman who looks like she might be pregnant and we both think she is (though we cannot be sure). You say you think her baby will be blond, I say I think her baby will be brown haired. We are making 2 claims - that she is pregnant and the hair colour of her child. So any of the following could be true: 1. She is pregnant and the baby will be blond (ie we are both right that she's pregnant and you are right about the hair colour) 2. She is pregnant and the baby will be brown haired (ie we are both right that she is pregnant and I am right about the hair colour) 3. She is pregnant and the baby is neither blond nor brown haired (we are right that she is pregnant but neither of us is right about the hair colour) 4. She is not pregnant at all (is neither of us is right that she is pregnant and our speculation about the hair colour is meaningless). So too if I assert killing is objectively wrong I am making two claims - 1. there is an objective measure of goodness and 2. killing does not conform to it. So if I disagree with another objective moralist on whether killing is wrong, we still agree that there is some standard of morality. We could be wrong but the fact we disagree is irrelevant to this. Your analogy is not relevant because the options are only variants and not absolute truths. Objective moralists cannot disagree if there is only one objective truth. The fact you disagree is the whole point. Ok I give up. Let us agree to disagree.
|
|