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Post by phludowin on Mar 25, 2018 9:22:51 GMT
To clarify: I believe the Libet experiments proved that there is no body/"soul"-dualism. It's true that he was researching free will; but it's not that uncommon that scientists are looking for something and find something else. Viagra anyone? In my opinion the nonexistance of an immortal "soul" that can exist without a body is enough evidence against afterlife. Where do nonexistant souls go? Answer: Nowhere. I don't remember ever hearing of Pascal's Wager before I went nutty religious back in '12, and someone on the old board had to explain it to me. Normally I avoid the whole thing, but your post has reminded me that if you're right, nothing is hurt, because we all go nowhere when we die. However, if you're wrong, you're going to look like the world's biggest chump, and I find that funny. If you have any evidence that might show that I'm wrong, feel free to share it. Real, solid evidence of course. Not YouTube videos with accounts of 23-minutes long hallucinations. |
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Post by general313 on Mar 25, 2018 17:45:39 GMT
I think there's an error in your odds calculation for the coin tossing. If you flipped the coin once, it would be wrong to summarize thusly: 1. predicts your results only 50% of the time (.5^1). 2. predicts your results 100% of the time With a single coin toss, landing on heads, I have equal reason to believe that the coin is a fair or a trick coin. But in any case repeated tosses of the coin ending up heads would increase my suspicion that it is a trick coin. After 4 tosses the probability that they land the same side up would be .5^3 (for a fair coin). I will confess that in my physics and engineering background I never ran across Bayes, even in my statistical physics classes, so I do have limited familiarity with its uses. I do have an appreciation of its utility in some problems (for example medical diagnosis applications). I'm just skeptical that it can bring meaningful results when the "input data" is so speculative. I think this article gives a pretty balanced look at it. Here's an excerpt: But let's rewind for a bit, and we can then talk more about Bayes afterwards. phludowin claimed that science had proven that there is no afterlife, then appealed to Occam's razor to justify that stance. Do you agree with that assessment? I'm not sure why you think my odds calculation is in error, but you're free to use whatever odds you want as I don't want to get tripped up over that. When you say: "repeated tosses of the coin ending up heads would increase my suspicion that it is a trick coin" that's close to what I'm getting at. But HOW much does repeated tosses increase your suspicion? How many tosses does it take? See, the answer to those questions entirely depends on what your priors are; in this case, the prior would be the probability that you have a trick coin VS a fair coin to begin with. We all know fair coins are more common, but we have no precise idea of HOW much more common. Yet, despite not having a precise idea of how much more common, you admit that repeated tosses increase your suspicion. See, that's the thing: when you say that, you're doing Bayesian reasoning even if you aren't able to put a precise number on your priors. If you were to say "it would take 10 tosses to convince me it was most likely a trick coin," you can actually work backwards from that (someone better with numbers than me could write it algebraically): If it was 5000:1 (fair:trick), then 10 tosses would change that to 5:1 (trick:fair - at least by my odds). To extend this metaphor, most science works more like the above than, say, finding an experiment that allows you to just turn the coin over and see definitively whether it's a trick coin or not. Most science proceeds by finding evidence that progressively alters our priors until eventually we have strong or overwhelming evidence that one hypothesis/theory is most likely. But there are plenty of scientific areas where we don't have that level of evidence, or we have conflicting evidence, or we have no evidence but the simplicity of the various hypotheses (interpretations of quantum physics is an example of the latter). You can express all of these ideas in Bayesian terms, regardless of how precise/imprecise a number you can put on your priors. Eh, I wouldn't go as far as to say it's proved there's no afterlife. I don't even think that's the right way of looking at such issues. I view that more like how I view Many Worlds in quantum physics: it's the simplest explanation that should be assumed by default until any evidence is presented for a more complex hypothesis. I don't think one should bother wasting time on proving (or claiming it's been proved that) more complex hypotheses are false. I'm also rather curious as to why he thinks the Libet experiment proved that, since I thought that was mostly an experiment about free will. It's easy for someone to just propose that all our thoughts/mind are connected to our brain until death until at which point they uncouple. That's basically what people seem to think about the soul/body connection in general (I mean, those that believe this malarkey to begin with). For the coin tossing scenario, I'm just pointing out that after one toss, you have no data to suggest that alternative 1 is more likely than alternative 2, only with two tosses can you begin to suspect that it is more likely that the coin is a trick coin. Agreed though not to get hung up on details here. One could use Bayes to calculate odds in the coin tossing scenario, but it's not the only way, and probably not the simplest. If I'm told that the coin was tossed 5 or 10 times and came up heads each time, I have all the information needed to make a calculation. Whether the result is always heads or some other mixture of heads or tails, the ordering makes no difference to the calculation, so "priors" are irrelevant here. I think it's that way with scientific evidence as well: we don't have to know what was considered the most likely theory before new experimental results come in, we can evaluate the situation weighing all the evidence (old and new together, in any order). It seems we are on the same page with the interpretation of the Libet experiment. I think he, you and I share the same view about souls and the afterlife (that neither exists), but when there's talk of scientific proof, I have to raise a flag, as much as it would raise eyebrows if someone said science has proven that god doesn't exist. |
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Post by The Herald Erjen on Mar 25, 2018 18:32:24 GMT
I don't remember ever hearing of Pascal's Wager before I went nutty religious back in '12, and someone on the old board had to explain it to me. Normally I avoid the whole thing, but your post has reminded me that if you're right, nothing is hurt, because we all go nowhere when we die. However, if you're wrong, you're going to look like the world's biggest chump, and I find that funny. If you have any evidence that might show that I'm wrong, feel free to share it. Real, solid evidence of course. Not YouTube videos with accounts of 23-minutes long hallucinations. Nyaaaah. Let's just wait and see what happens. It'll be more fun that way. |
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Post by phludowin on Mar 25, 2018 18:50:16 GMT
If you have any evidence that might show that I'm wrong, feel free to share it. Real, solid evidence of course. Not YouTube videos with accounts of 23-minutes long hallucinations. Nyaaaah. Let's just wait and see what happens. It'll be more fun that way. So no evidence. I am not surprised. |
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Post by The Herald Erjen on Mar 25, 2018 19:47:59 GMT
Nyaaaah. Let's just wait and see what happens. It'll be more fun that way. So no evidence. I am not surprised. Can you indicate on this thread (or any other) where I claimed to have evidence that you or any other materialist would accept? You can scroll up and read what I wrote again if you're having trouble remembering. |
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Post by phludowin on Mar 25, 2018 20:48:18 GMT
So no evidence. I am not surprised. Can you indicate on this thread (or any other) where I claimed to have evidence that you or any other materialist would accept? You can scroll up and read what I wrote again if you're having trouble remembering. Can you indicate on this thread (or any other) where I claimed that you claimed to have evidence that me or any other materialist would accept? You can scroll up and read what I wrote again if you're having trouble remembering. |
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Post by The Herald Erjen on Mar 25, 2018 20:52:52 GMT
Can you indicate on this thread (or any other) where I claimed to have evidence that you or any other materialist would accept? You can scroll up and read what I wrote again if you're having trouble remembering. Can you indicate on this thread (or any other) where I claimed that you claimed to have evidence that me or any other materialist would accept? You can scroll up and read what I wrote again if you're having trouble remembering. The word "evidence" didn't come up until you brought it up, Jack. I was talking about what happens, if anything, after it's all said and done with regard to mortal life.....which is the gist of Pascal's Wager.....if I'm not wrong. |
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Post by phludowin on Mar 25, 2018 22:00:57 GMT
I was talking about what happens, if anything, after it's all said and done with regard to mortal life.....which is the gist of Pascal's Wager.....if I'm not wrong. And I asked if you had any evidence for your opinion. I never claimed you had any. |
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Mar 26, 2018 1:31:40 GMT
Eh, I wouldn't go as far as to say it's proved there's no afterlife. I don't even think that's the right way of looking at such issues. I view that more like how I view Many Worlds in quantum physics: it's the simplest explanation that should be assumed by default until any evidence is presented for a more complex hypothesis. I don't think one should bother wasting time on proving (or claiming it's been proved that) more complex hypotheses are false. I'm also rather curious as to why he thinks the Libet experiment proved that, since I thought that was mostly an experiment about free will. It's easy for someone to just propose that all our thoughts/mind are connected to our brain until death until at which point they uncouple. That's basically what people seem to think about the soul/body connection in general (I mean, those that believe this malarkey to begin with). To clarify: I believe the Libet experiments proved that there is no body/"soul"-dualism. It's true that he was researching free will; but it's not that uncommon that scientists are looking for something and find something else. Viagra anyone? In my opinion the nonexistance of an immortal "soul" that can exist without a body is enough evidence against afterlife. Where do nonexistant souls go? Answer: Nowhere. That’s what I’m not clear on: WHY do you think Libet proved that there’s no body/soul dualism? Most (modern, anyway) dualists freely admit that the brain plays a major role in the operation of our mind, but also believe it’s possible for mind to be uncoupled with the brain in the form of spirit. Like you, I obviously don’t buy the claim, but I’m not sure why you think Libet disproved this. In fact, I can’t imagine how it would be falsifiable to begin with. |
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Mar 26, 2018 2:02:26 GMT
I'm not sure why you think my odds calculation is in error, but you're free to use whatever odds you want as I don't want to get tripped up over that. When you say: "repeated tosses of the coin ending up heads would increase my suspicion that it is a trick coin" that's close to what I'm getting at. But HOW much does repeated tosses increase your suspicion? How many tosses does it take? See, the answer to those questions entirely depends on what your priors are; in this case, the prior would be the probability that you have a trick coin VS a fair coin to begin with. We all know fair coins are more common, but we have no precise idea of HOW much more common. Yet, despite not having a precise idea of how much more common, you admit that repeated tosses increase your suspicion. See, that's the thing: when you say that, you're doing Bayesian reasoning even if you aren't able to put a precise number on your priors. If you were to say "it would take 10 tosses to convince me it was most likely a trick coin," you can actually work backwards from that (someone better with numbers than me could write it algebraically): If it was 5000:1 (fair:trick), then 10 tosses would change that to 5:1 (trick:fair - at least by my odds). To extend this metaphor, most science works more like the above than, say, finding an experiment that allows you to just turn the coin over and see definitively whether it's a trick coin or not. Most science proceeds by finding evidence that progressively alters our priors until eventually we have strong or overwhelming evidence that one hypothesis/theory is most likely. But there are plenty of scientific areas where we don't have that level of evidence, or we have conflicting evidence, or we have no evidence but the simplicity of the various hypotheses (interpretations of quantum physics is an example of the latter). You can express all of these ideas in Bayesian terms, regardless of how precise/imprecise a number you can put on your priors. Eh, I wouldn't go as far as to say it's proved there's no afterlife. I don't even think that's the right way of looking at such issues. I view that more like how I view Many Worlds in quantum physics: it's the simplest explanation that should be assumed by default until any evidence is presented for a more complex hypothesis. I don't think one should bother wasting time on proving (or claiming it's been proved that) more complex hypotheses are false. I'm also rather curious as to why he thinks the Libet experiment proved that, since I thought that was mostly an experiment about free will. It's easy for someone to just propose that all our thoughts/mind are connected to our brain until death until at which point they uncouple. That's basically what people seem to think about the soul/body connection in general (I mean, those that believe this malarkey to begin with). For the coin tossing scenario, I'm just pointing out that after one toss, you have no data to suggest that alternative 1 is more likely than alternative 2, only with two tosses can you begin to suspect that it is more likely that the coin is a trick coin. Agreed though not to get hung up on details here. One could use Bayes to calculate odds in the coin tossing scenario, but it's not the only way, and probably not the simplest. If I'm told that the coin was tossed 5 or 10 times and came up heads each time, I have all the information needed to make a calculation. Whether the result is always heads or some other mixture of heads or tails, the ordering makes no difference to the calculation, so "priors" are irrelevant here. I think it's that way with scientific evidence as well: we don't have to know what was considered the most likely theory before new experimental results come in, we can evaluate the situation weighing all the evidence (old and new together, in any order). It seems we are on the same page with the interpretation of the Libet experiment. I think he, you and I share the same view about souls and the afterlife (that neither exists), but when there's talk of scientific proof, I have to raise a flag, as much as it would raise eyebrows if someone said science has proven that god doesn't exist. I disagree with your first paragraph, but I don't want to get sidetracked so I'd prefer we drop it. Your middle paragraph is simply wrong, particularly the "I have all the information needed" part. Knowing that the coin came up heads 5 or 10 times only gives you the conditionals, the new evidence, but it can't tell you how likely the coin is a trick coin without defining the priors. You either do this beforehand, or you do it afterwards once you decide you're convinced. There's no way you can convince yourself the coin is a trick coin otherwise. Literally the only time priors don't matter is when you conduct an experiment where the conditionals (B|A and B|~A) are 1 and 0 and respectively, and that's rarely the case. Let's alter the scenario a bit. Same all-heads tosses, but this time you found the coin in a magic shop. Does this alter how many tosses it would take to convince you? If you answer yes (the obvious answer, IMO), the entire reason is because the context alters your priors: you'd expect to find more trick coins in a magic shop rather than at random. Most supernatural stuff makes its living by insulating itself from being falsifiable. As Yudkowsky would phrase it, it squats in people's brains without paying rent in anticipated experiences. You can't falsify stuff that's so ill-defined that it can't make any unique predictions to start with, so any evidence that is produced people just ad hoc the beliefs to fit the evidence. |
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Mar 26, 2018 4:48:16 GMT
First, at least ideally, there is a precision to it. In Solomonoff induction hypotheses are expressed as binary code whose simplicity is calculable and thus directly comparable to other hypotheses. The problem with Solomonoff is that it's (currently) impractical; but at least in theory, there is a way to precisely tell us how likely our hypotheses/theories are. Second, that we're imprecise about our uncertainty isn't really a problem for Bayesian approaches; you aren't any less uncertain by NOT applying Bayes. The thing to understand is that all probability is about modeling uncertainty. The only difference with stuff like dice and coins is that we know precisely what we know (how many sides) and precisely what we don't know (effect of gravity on roll/toss) so it makes it easy to express in numbers. That doesn't mean we can't make educated guesses when it comes to modeling our less precise uncertainty in other areas. I do this in poker all the time. The only thing I know precisely is my hand, the community cards, and the cards remaining either in the deck or other players' hands; however, this doesn't mean much if I can't put my opponent on a range of possible hands given how they're playing. One can't be precise about that, but one can make educated guesses, and the quality of those guesses will have a direct impact on the quality of one's decision making. It wouldn't. I don't know why you think it would. Our estimations change as our knowledge changes. That's the entire idea behind Bayes. It's the lesson to be learned from the Monty Hall Problem and its variants. I'm skipping the rest of your post because I think it's mostly just restatements of the above point. I think you're rather confused about what Bayes is and the use of probability theory as a model for how scientific evidence works. So instead of responding to those points, let me devise a simple thought experiment: You've found a coin and immediately start flipping it. It lands on heads four times in a row. There are two hypotheses: 1. It's a fair coin 2. It's a trick coin 1. predicts your results only 6% of the time (.5^4). 2. Predicts your results 100% of the time. Do you think it's a trick coin? If so, why? If not, how many flips with the same result would it take to convince you? I'll leave it there for now. I'll have more to say in the next post as this thought experiment is pretty good illustration of my point(s). I will confess that in my physics and engineering background I never ran across Bayes, even in my statistical physics classes, so I do have limited familiarity with its uses. I do have an appreciation of its utility in some problems (for example medical diagnosis applications). I'm just skeptical that it can bring meaningful results when the "input data" is so speculative. I think this article gives a pretty balanced look at it. Here's an excerpt: I also wanted to address this now as I didn't have time to read the article earlier. I think his objection boils down to this: My rebuttal would be this: re-read the article, but replace "Bayes" with "logic" and "evidence" with "propositions" and it's the same argument. Logic is only as good at yielding true conclusions as the truthfulness of our propositions. "All tigers are blue, fish are tigers, fish are blue" is logically valid even though every sentence is false. It's neither the fault of Bayes nor logic when our inputs are bad. The point is, however, that the correct way to reason is through logic, and the correct way to process evidence to update beliefs is Bayesian. The whole point with my coin flip experiment was to demonstrate a few principles: 1. At some point, you will become convinced you have a trick coin. (at what point this happens is an imprecise, subjective judgment) 2. When you do, you can algebraically calculate your prior even though your prior is/was an imprecise estimation. 3. With fewer flips, your prior plays a bigger role in your estimation of the coin's fairness than does the evidence of the flips. |
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Post by phludowin on Mar 26, 2018 13:35:12 GMT
That’s what I’m not clear on: WHY do you think Libet proved that there’s no body/soul dualism? Most (modern, anyway) dualists freely admit that the brain plays a major role in the operation of our mind, but also believe it’s possible for mind to be uncoupled with the brain in the form of spirit. Like you, I obviously don’t buy the claim, but I’m not sure why you think Libet disproved this. In fact, I can’t imagine how it would be falsifiable to begin with. Because what Libet showed is that the body started its activities before the brain did. What this means, in my opinion, is: The whole person, body, mind and spirit, works together and makes a decision. That's why those who claim that humans don't have free will are just wrong. It's ultimately the person who makes the decision. It may not always be a conscious decision, and it may be influenced from the outside, but ultimately, the person, which is composed of body, mind and spirit, is the one making the decision. Therefore, people have free will, even if it's not conscious. This also means, to reiterate a point raised in an earlier post (possibly on another thread): If my complete memory was to be recorded in a computer, and if this computer became a sentient thing with my memories, then it still would not make the same decisions as I would. Because it wouldn't have my body. In other words: This computer would not be me, and not have the same personality. |
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Mar 26, 2018 14:49:32 GMT
That’s what I’m not clear on: WHY do you think Libet proved that there’s no body/soul dualism? Most (modern, anyway) dualists freely admit that the brain plays a major role in the operation of our mind, but also believe it’s possible for mind to be uncoupled with the brain in the form of spirit. Like you, I obviously don’t buy the claim, but I’m not sure why you think Libet disproved this. In fact, I can’t imagine how it would be falsifiable to begin with. Because what Libet showed is that the body started its activities before the brain did. What this means, in my opinion, is: The whole person, body, mind and spirit, works together and makes a decision. That's why those who claim that humans don't have free will are just wrong. It's ultimately the person who makes the decision. It may not always be a conscious decision, and it may be influenced from the outside, but ultimately, the person, which is composed of body, mind and spirit, is the one making the decision. Therefore, people have free will, even if it's not conscious. This also means, to reiterate a point raised in an earlier post (possibly on another thread): If my complete memory was to be recorded in a computer, and if this computer became a sentient thing with my memories, then it still would not make the same decisions as I would. Because it wouldn't have my body. In other words: This computer would not be me, and not have the same personality. Hmmm, I guess it's been too long since I read up on Libet, because I thought the gist of the experiment was that he showed that the brain made its decisions before it reached consciousness, not that the body reacted first. Likewise with free will, the modern argument is more over how it can be "free" if the person is ultimately just a puppet of deterministic physics. I buy into the compatabilist notion though as espoused by Dennett (and Carroll, in one of the best laymen's arguments I've encountered). I still think it's possible for any dualist to still say that body/mind/brain/spirit work in concert while alive, but that spirit and mind can continue after death without the body/brain. I simply don't know how that notion is falsifiable, even if the body acts before a brain does. |
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Post by Deleted on Mar 26, 2018 15:24:40 GMT
Stupid, but misunderstood by some moronic atheists So i see that you are not able to tell us what atheists have misunderstood. I guess you don`t know yourself. |
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Post by general313 on Mar 26, 2018 15:41:10 GMT
I will confess that in my physics and engineering background I never ran across Bayes, even in my statistical physics classes, so I do have limited familiarity with its uses. I do have an appreciation of its utility in some problems (for example medical diagnosis applications). I'm just skeptical that it can bring meaningful results when the "input data" is so speculative. I think this article gives a pretty balanced look at it. Here's an excerpt: I also wanted to address this now as I didn't have time to read the article earlier. I think his objection boils down to this: My rebuttal would be this: re-read the article, but replace "Bayes" with "logic" and "evidence" with "propositions" and it's the same argument. Logic is only as good at yielding true conclusions as the truthfulness of our propositions. "All tigers are blue, fish are tigers, fish are blue" is logically valid even though every sentence is false. It's neither the fault of Bayes nor logic when our inputs are bad. The point is, however, that the correct way to reason is through logic, and the correct way to process evidence to update beliefs is Bayesian. The whole point with my coin flip experiment was to demonstrate a few principles: 1. At some point, you will become convinced you have a trick coin. (at what point this happens is an imprecise, subjective judgment) 2. When you do, you can algebraically calculate your prior even though your prior is/was an imprecise estimation. 3. With fewer flips, your prior plays a bigger role in your estimation of the coin's fairness than does the evidence of the flips. That's a good rebuttal. I'd make an additional point (that may have been alluded to in the article) - the Bayes formula is the product of 3 factors (with a multiplication and a division), so that if two or more probabilities have substantial uncertainty the resulting uncertainty will be greatly amplified. I do see where you were coming from with your coin flipping scenario. In your initial example there was no suggestion of prior knowledge about the coin, so I was assuming that one would assume it was a fair coin, hence my analysis bypassing the "prior knowledge". #3 is a particularly nice and terse observation |
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Post by phludowin on Mar 26, 2018 17:08:48 GMT
Hmmm, I guess it's been too long since I read up on Libet, because I thought the gist of the experiment was that he showed that the brain made its decisions before it reached consciousness, not that the body reacted first. Likewise with free will, the modern argument is more over how it can be "free" if the person is ultimately just a puppet of deterministic physics. I buy into the compatabilist notion though as espoused by Dennett (and Carroll, in one of the best laymen's arguments I've encountered). I still think it's possible for any dualist to still say that body/mind/brain/spirit work in concert while alive, but that spirit and mind can continue after death without the body/brain. I simply don't know how that notion is falsifiable, even if the body acts before a brain does. The brain is part of the body. About spirit/mind existing without body/brain: I tend to be materialist, and I don't believe that spirit/mind can exist without a host. It would take solid evidence for that to modify my belief about the nonexistance of an afterlife. So far, dualists have failed to provide any. |
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Post by cupcakes on Mar 26, 2018 20:49:48 GMT
tpfkar However, if you're wrong, you're going to look like the world's biggest chump, and I find that funny. To whom / to what? And surely you can't think looking like that is too bad.
You don't say |
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Mar 27, 2018 1:18:13 GMT
I also wanted to address this now as I didn't have time to read the article earlier. I think his objection boils down to this: My rebuttal would be this: re-read the article, but replace "Bayes" with "logic" and "evidence" with "propositions" and it's the same argument. Logic is only as good at yielding true conclusions as the truthfulness of our propositions. "All tigers are blue, fish are tigers, fish are blue" is logically valid even though every sentence is false. It's neither the fault of Bayes nor logic when our inputs are bad. The point is, however, that the correct way to reason is through logic, and the correct way to process evidence to update beliefs is Bayesian. The whole point with my coin flip experiment was to demonstrate a few principles: 1. At some point, you will become convinced you have a trick coin. (at what point this happens is an imprecise, subjective judgment) 2. When you do, you can algebraically calculate your prior even though your prior is/was an imprecise estimation. 3. With fewer flips, your prior plays a bigger role in your estimation of the coin's fairness than does the evidence of the flips. That's a good rebuttal. I'd make an additional point (that may have been alluded to in the article) - the Bayes formula is the product of 3 factors (with a multiplication and a division), so that if two or more probabilities have substantial uncertainty the resulting uncertainty will be greatly amplified. I do see where you were coming from with your coin flipping scenario. In your initial example there was no suggestion of prior knowledge about the coin, so I was assuming that one would assume it was a fair coin, hence my analysis bypassing the "prior knowledge". #3 is a particularly nice and terse observation As I said earlier, probability is all about modeling uncertainty, so the problem is really more about precise VS imprecise certainty & uncertainty rather than just uncertainty itself, but your point is taken. I'd never deny the GIGO axiom. Yeah, I was a bit sneaky with coin flip scenario as I intentionally left out the priors. I wanted to show that, once the evidence has convinced you, you've basically defined your priors regardless of whether you had beforehand. Also, considering our discussion started over the important of Occam and priors, that it really depended on the type of evidence whether the prior or the evidence was more important in determining how likely you thought a hypothesis was. |
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Mar 27, 2018 1:21:24 GMT
Hmmm, I guess it's been too long since I read up on Libet, because I thought the gist of the experiment was that he showed that the brain made its decisions before it reached consciousness, not that the body reacted first. Likewise with free will, the modern argument is more over how it can be "free" if the person is ultimately just a puppet of deterministic physics. I buy into the compatabilist notion though as espoused by Dennett (and Carroll, in one of the best laymen's arguments I've encountered). I still think it's possible for any dualist to still say that body/mind/brain/spirit work in concert while alive, but that spirit and mind can continue after death without the body/brain. I simply don't know how that notion is falsifiable, even if the body acts before a brain does. The brain is part of the body. About spirit/mind existing without body/brain: I tend to be materialist, and I don't believe that spirit/mind can exist without a host. It would take solid evidence for that to modify my belief about the nonexistance of an afterlife. So far, dualists have failed to provide any. I don't disagree there. We also disagree RE materialism, but I'm just saying I don't see how Libet proved that spirit/mind couldn't exist without body/brain. The latter idea is just too ill-defined and makes no predictions and can't be falsified, so it's really just a hypotheses we dismiss/don't seriously consider rather than bothering about disproving. |
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Post by permutojoe on Mar 27, 2018 2:26:43 GMT
dividavi It might be that God sends only non-believers to Heaven while He dispatches believers to the Hell that they wish on others. This. It would be ironic punishment if the only people who went to hell were those who lived happy in the belief that anyone who didn't share their dogma were going to burn in agony forever. And side note, I would not want to go to heaven if these types of people were there. Just unplug me from the matrix altogether rather than have to hang with them forever.
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