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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 10, 2017 18:52:35 GMT
"Let me amend that to: it was rather assholish" Being patronizing isn't assholish? I wasn't being patronizing. I have no idea what you know or don't know on the subject. When I state what I know it's an attempt to establish a common ground and make sure we're on the same page regarding priors. It's not an attempt to be patronizing. Your accusation of it being patronizing is what's assholish. This is written as if you're instructing me, contra my error: "What you're describing is metaphysical impossibility, not logical impossibility. To use a classic example, saying 'water is not H20' is logically possible, but metaphysically impossible."
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Post by Cinemachinery on Apr 10, 2017 20:03:20 GMT
Ada's left a huge gap. Neither was able to maintain the non-stop bickering she did at all times - she's left quite the load to carry. Cinemachinery, you can say whatever you want, and you can even believe what you say if you like, but the truth is that you posted only moments before I switched on my computer and logged on to this site. You're not so important that I have to keep a constant watch on you. Ooookay.... ::mejyds:: That was out of left field. Bannon is still Chief Security Adviser.
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 12, 2017 10:01:18 GMT
My saying p-zombies are logically possible is solely due to my understanding of what logical possibility entails: namely, inherent contradictions because of terms that are wholly definitional in nature: a married bachelor being the famous example I think the imagined, such as p-zombies, need to be really imaginable and it's not enough to say that an imagined p-zombie is a given logically possibility. It has to be imagined behaviourally, functionally, or physically. I can't empirically ascertain that the physical is the only substance, so I take it as a sound logical possibility. Given this, if I was to take p-zombies as a logical possibility then I would, by equivalence, be rejecting materialism as a logical possibility and so be a pluralist by any other name.
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Post by general313 on Apr 12, 2017 15:04:35 GMT
My saying p-zombies are logically possible is solely due to my understanding of what logical possibility entails: namely, inherent contradictions because of terms that are wholly definitional in nature: a married bachelor being the famous example I think the imagined, such as p-zombies, need to be really imaginable and it's not enough to say that an imagined p-zombie is a given logically possibility. It has to be imagined behaviourally, functionally, or physically. I can't empirically ascertain that the physical is the only substance, so I take it as a sound logical possibility. Given this, if I was to take p-zombies as a logical possibility then I would, by equivalence, be rejecting materialism as a logical possibility and so be a pluralist by any other name. I believe there are two errors here: 1) The existence of a p-zombie doesn't contradict materialism. If anything, a non p-zombie (ie. a conscious being) is more troubling to the monist. 2) If I support the possibility of something that implies dualism, I am not refuting monism. I would have to assert the certainty of that something.
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 12, 2017 15:08:46 GMT
tpfkar For me it comes down to knowledge. As long as there are parts of the physical that we cannot detect, p-zombies will be eminently (logically, hypothetically) possible. If we include ability to examine and understand all physical phenomena, then they would be impossible, as whatever physical difference distinguished a p-zombie from a conscious human would be discernible. Anytime. Anywhere. Anyone.
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 12, 2017 16:34:15 GMT
I believe there are two errors here: 1) The existence of a p-zombie doesn't contradict materialism. If anything, a non p-zombie (ie. a conscious being) is more troubling to the monist. 2) If I support the possibility of something that implies dualism, I am not refuting monism. I would have to assert the certainty of that something. P-zombies were historically posited to question materialism which is equivalent to saying that the mental states are not dependent on brain states, an independent mind so as to negate it from the body. Materialism is a monist position in which one physical substance as opposed to idealism, one mental substance, but the p-zombie does ask us to posit a body so it isn't advocating idealism, and it's not advocating materialism either because it assumes something other than the physical to negate in the first place, a dualism.
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 12, 2017 16:35:37 GMT
tpfkar For me it comes down to knowledge. As long as there are parts of the physical that we cannot detect, p-zombies will be eminently (logically, hypothetically) possible. If we include ability to examine and understand all physical phenomena, then they would be impossible, as whatever physical difference distinguished a p-zombie from a conscious human would be discernible. Anytime. Anywhere. Anyone.Please read my comment to cham313 and let me know what you think.
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 12, 2017 19:10:24 GMT
tpfkar I don't think they accomplish that intent. Depending on the details of their description, they're either not possible logically, or their hypothetical existence doesn't bruise materialism (perhaps more precisely for me, physicalism). close enough
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Post by general313 on Apr 12, 2017 23:41:37 GMT
I believe there are two errors here: 1) The existence of a p-zombie doesn't contradict materialism. If anything, a non p-zombie (ie. a conscious being) is more troubling to the monist. 2) If I support the possibility of something that implies dualism, I am not refuting monism. I would have to assert the certainty of that something. P-zombies were historically posited to question materialism which is equivalent to saying that the mental states are not dependent on brain states, an independent mind so as to negate it from the body. Materialism is a monist position in which one physical substance as opposed to idealism, one mental substance, but the p-zombie does ask us to posit a body so it isn't advocating idealism, and it's not advocating materialism either because it assumes something other than the physical to negate in the first place, a dualism. I don't see how a p-zombie contradicts materialism. If a conscious being can exist in a materialist reality, why not a p-zombie as well? I don't think one can assume that if both conscious beings and zombies exist, that one must have a different number of aspects than the other. We also don't know if a computational neurological system that computes all that is necessary to achieve artificial intelligence automatically gives rise to consciousness. It could be that consciousness arises from some other kind of algorithm in execution, one that tethers to the processing for the artificial intelligence (to take a monist view of things). Maybe a sort of "algorithmic pineal gland", with no dualist properties/connections necessary. In that case a being missing this software organ would be a p-zombie.
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 1:58:30 GMT
tpfkar I don't think they accomplish that intent. Depending on the details of their description, they're either not possible logically, or their hypothetical existence doesn't bruise materialism (perhaps more precisely for me, physicalism). close enoughClassic reductive materialism is not considered in the current scientific paradigm of functionalism, so If not reductive materialism then a dependence materialism maybe: mental states dependent on brain states as opposed to mental states type-identifying with brain states. P-zombies were posited so that their equivalence negated a brain-dependent mind, i.e. intended to contradict dependence materialism. If you think that they don't accomplish their intent, then we are in agreement. I understand what you're saying in that the mind is ultimately physical and that you could imagine a demarcation whose description could be agreed upon, but given reduction being problematic, I don't think there are such sufficient descriptions to justifiably negate the physical part that is considered mind. So if semantically invalid then an unsound proposition regardless of possibility. My point to any physical monist is that to consider possible p-zombies is to not consider a necessary physical monism, historically and logically.
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 2:05:33 GMT
I don't see how a p-zombie contradicts materialism. If a conscious being can exist in a materialist reality, why not a p-zombie as well? I don't think one can assume that if both conscious beings and zombies exist, that one must have a different number of aspects than the other. We also don't know if a computational neurological system that computes all that is necessary to achieve artificial intelligence automatically gives rise to consciousness. It could be that consciousness arises from some other kind of algorithm in execution, one that tethers to the processing for the artificial intelligence (to take a monist view of things). Maybe a sort of "algorithmic pineal gland", with no dualist properties/connections necessary. In that case a being missing this software organ would be a p-zombie. Classic reductive materialism is not considered in the current scientific paradigm of functionalism, so If not reductive materialism then a dependence materialism maybe: mental states dependent on brain states as opposed to mental states type-identifying with brain states. P-zombies were posited so that their equivalence negated a brain-dependent mind, i.e. intended to contradict dependence materialism. Dependence materialism, i.e. mental states dependent on brain states: B→M. P-zombie is brain states without mental states: B&-M, which is equivalent to -(B→M) which means possibly not dependence materialism or not necessarily dependence materialism. This is the p-zombie argument stripped down to its logically possible bones. This is why p-zombies were posited to arrive at this equivalence. So with 'consciousness arises from some other kind of algorithm in execution' and 'no dualist properties/connections necessary' you are advocating the very non-reductive, dependence materialism p-zombies sets out to contradict.
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 13, 2017 4:36:46 GMT
tpfkar If "indistinguishable" is with (conceptual) full view of the physical, then they could not exist. If "indistinguishable" means impossible to tell the difference given incomplete mapping of the physical, then they say nothing about materialism/physicalism. So for me, p-zombies don't negate the physical in any case. mommy
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 16:49:35 GMT
I wasn't being patronizing. I have no idea what you know or don't know on the subject. When I state what I know it's an attempt to establish a common ground and make sure we're on the same page regarding priors. It's not an attempt to be patronizing. Your accusation of it being patronizing is what's assholish. This is written as if you're instructing me, contra my error: "What you're describing is metaphysical impossibility, not logical impossibility. To use a classic example, saying 'water is not H20' is logically possible, but metaphysically impossible." It's written as if I believe that's the case, which I do. If I'm wrong you're free to "instruct me" as to why. No patronization was intended and I honestly don't feel "superior" to you (I don't know you well enough to feel superior or inferior or equal).
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 16:53:08 GMT
My saying p-zombies are logically possible is solely due to my understanding of what logical possibility entails: namely, inherent contradictions because of terms that are wholly definitional in nature: a married bachelor being the famous example I think the imagined, such as p-zombies, need to be really imaginable and it's not enough to say that an imagined p-zombie is a given logically possibility. It has to be imagined behaviourally, functionally, or physically. I can't empirically ascertain that the physical is the only substance, so I take it as a sound logical possibility. Given this, if I was to take p-zombies as a logical possibility then I would, by equivalence, be rejecting materialism as a logical possibility and so be a pluralist by any other name. I take by "really imaginable" you mean "behaviorally, functionally, or physically--" but that's pretty much achieved in the thought experiment itself since they're defined as being "behaviorally... etc." identical to us with the exception of not experiencing consciousness. I think cham answered the second part: taking P-Zombies as a logical possibility isn't to deny materialism as a logical possibility. They can both be logically possible even if only one is metaphysically possible or actual.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 16:55:09 GMT
This is written as if you're instructing me, contra my error: "What you're describing is metaphysical impossibility, not logical impossibility. To use a classic example, saying 'water is not H20' is logically possible, but metaphysically impossible." It's written as if I believe that's the case, which I do. If I'm wrong you're free to "instruct me" as to why. No patronization was intended and I honestly don't feel "superior" to you (I don't know you well enough to feel superior or inferior or equal). Okay, lets try it this way: what would you say are the criteria for something being logically possible?
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 16:58:15 GMT
P-zombies were historically posited to question materialism which is equivalent to saying that the mental states are not dependent on brain states, an independent mind so as to negate it from the body. Materialism is a monist position in which one physical substance as opposed to idealism, one mental substance, but the p-zombie does ask us to posit a body so it isn't advocating idealism, and it's not advocating materialism either because it assumes something other than the physical to negate in the first place, a dualism. I don't see how a p-zombie contradicts materialism. If a conscious being can exist in a materialist reality, why not a p-zombie as well? I would agree in general that P-Zombies don't necessarily contradict materialism, but they do contradict Reductive Materialism, or the notion that once you've reduced a physical system down to all its interrelated parts you have necessarily explained consciousness. It's still possible that consciousness is physical in nature, but it wouldn't be reductive in nature (though it's also not clear how it could be physical if you've fully reduced the material brain but haven't explained consciousness).
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 16:59:12 GMT
It's written as if I believe that's the case, which I do. If I'm wrong you're free to "instruct me" as to why. No patronization was intended and I honestly don't feel "superior" to you (I don't know you well enough to feel superior or inferior or equal). Okay, lets try it this way: what would you say are the criteria for something being logically possible? That it's not contradictory by definition, ala "married bachelor."
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 17:01:38 GMT
Okay, lets try it this way: what would you say are the criteria for something being logically possible? That it's not contradictory by definition, ala "married bachelor." Right. So then you see it as only about language, relative to specific definitions?
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 17:49:56 GMT
That it's not contradictory by definition, ala "married bachelor." Right. So then you see it as only about language, relative to specific definitions? Yes. I said as much in this post: imdb2.freeforums.net/post/241360/threadBut beyond that, it's clear that some things can only be possible/impossible because of definitions while some things--the composition of water, what is or causes consciousness--are not just about definitions but also a posteriori evidence, typically empirical.
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 18:19:24 GMT
tpfkar If "indistinguishable" is with (conceptual) full view of the physical, then they could not exist. If "indistinguishable" means impossible to tell the difference given incomplete mapping of the physical, then they say nothing about materialism/physicalism. So for me, p-zombies don't negate the physical in any case.
A p-zombie is a thought experiment and is with most thought experiments, from EPR's 'spooky action at a distance' vs quantum entanglement to Jackson's colour-blind Mary vs no qualia, they set up B to contradict A by equivalence. So the mind being indistinguishable from the body means that the mind is dependent on the brain by virtue of being of the physical itself which means that there would be nothing to distinguish the p-zombie from the thinking person so we cannot negate a mind from the body because the mind is of the body itself. A p-zombie would be the same as a normal personal, and if no difference then no difference, rendering the p-zombie mute. If one is is saying that p-zombies could be ascertained by some descriptive bridging principle of states from mental types to brain types, so as to negate the mental types, then one is advocating a classic reductive view which is problematic. One may say that mental states depend on brain states as maybe an irreducible emergent physical phenomenon, or that the contemporary idea of mental states themselves are mere folk psychology in that they are ontologically unnecessary, but either way the idea of a mind separated p-zombie is not in any way possible with the words irreducible and unnecessary, respectively, being pertinent. But say that I'm wrong and that p-zombies don't contradict a physical monism, nor do they suggest a dualism and they're obviously not a comment about idealism, then given no ontological challenges and with regards to the mind-body problem, what use is there in considering p-zombies other than creative indulgence?
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