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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 22:22:52 GMT
Yes in a sense, but it also depends upon the existence of things that exist in definition only VS things that are empirical in nature. You don't discover "marriage" by observing reality, it only exists as a concept we defined. This isn't necessarily the case with something like "consciousness." Definitions play a role in defining the concept of consciousness, but we're also trying to define the concept in conjunction with our experience of it, which isn't the case with "bachelor" and "marriage" So then logical possibility isn't solely about definitions/language in your view? No, it is, but I'm saying it's also about things that ONLY exist in the linguistic/conceptual realm as opposed to things that also depend on empirical knowledge for how we (in part) define them.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 22:55:02 GMT
So then logical possibility isn't solely about definitions/language in your view? No, it is, but I'm saying it's also about things that ONLY exist in the linguistic/conceptual realm as opposed to things that also depend on empirical knowledge for how we (in part) define them. Okay, but we can define things any way we'd like relative to empirical data.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 23:03:10 GMT
No, it is, but I'm saying it's also about things that ONLY exist in the linguistic/conceptual realm as opposed to things that also depend on empirical knowledge for how we (in part) define them. Okay, but we can define things any way we'd like relative to empirical data. Sure (though we tend not to define anything in opposition to any empirical data about them).
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Post by general313 on Apr 14, 2017 0:10:40 GMT
I don't see how a p-zombie contradicts materialism. If a conscious being can exist in a materialist reality, why not a p-zombie as well? I would agree in general that P-Zombies don't necessarily contradict materialism, but they do contradict Reductive Materialism, or the notion that once you've reduced a physical system down to all its interrelated parts you have necessarily explained consciousness. It's still possible that consciousness is physical in nature, but it wouldn't be reductive in nature (though it's also not clear how it could be physical if you've fully reduced the material brain but haven't explained consciousness). As for contradicting Reductive Materialism, I think it depends on what was discovered about consciousness if it ever became possible to have some kind of detailed physical explanation for it. If we discovered some special aspect of a physical system that accounted for consciousness that was somehow independent of all the systems that were necessary for artificial intelligence, and that these physical systems could either have or lack that independent component, and thus either be conscious or zombie, then again I don't see the contradiction. I myself lean toward the view that consciousness will arise in any sufficiently intelligent being or machine, and that it is intrinsic to the functioning "mind", and zombies would never happen, but I (nor anyone else apparently) have no way of demonstrating that.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 14, 2017 0:45:49 GMT
I would agree in general that P-Zombies don't necessarily contradict materialism, but they do contradict Reductive Materialism, or the notion that once you've reduced a physical system down to all its interrelated parts you have necessarily explained consciousness. It's still possible that consciousness is physical in nature, but it wouldn't be reductive in nature (though it's also not clear how it could be physical if you've fully reduced the material brain but haven't explained consciousness). As for contradicting Reductive Materialism, I think it depends on what was discovered about consciousness if it ever became possible to have some kind of detailed physical explanation for it. If we discovered some special aspect of a physical system that accounted for consciousness that was somehow independent of all the systems that were necessary for artificial intelligence, and that these physical systems could either have or lack that independent component, and thus either be conscious or zombie, then again I don't see the contradiction. I myself lean toward the view that consciousness will arise in any sufficiently intelligent being or machine, and that it is intrinsic to the functioning "mind", and zombies would never happen, but I (nor anyone else apparently) have no way of demonstrating that. I do agree it's possible that we might find some physical "thing" that's responsible for consciousness, but I think it's just as likely that consciousness is just the first-person experience of BEING the physical system of a brain, and if it's the latter even if you explain how the system works from a third-person, quantitative perspective, you haven't necessarily explained the first-person qualitative perspective. As for consciousness arising in any sufficiently intelligent being, I think that raises the question of whether or not the physical substrate matters at all. Yudkowsky and Pigliucci had an interesting debate on this years ago: bloggingheads.tv/videos/2561
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