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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 11:28:30 GMT
Well, the straw in the water example isn't an example where you're seeing things incorrectly first off. It's an objective fact, not dependent on perception, that from particular reference points, reflections of light waves from a transparent glass/liquid/straw system are such that the straw looks bent within the liquid compared to outside of the liquid. The misconception there is a theoretical misconception, it's not a perceptual problem. And that theoretical misconception is one where reference point property variance facts are taken out of the picture, and we conceptually interpret data to be telling us or not telling us "what the straw is really like from a reference point-free perspective." There are no reference point-free perspectives, though, and from particular perspectives, what the straw is really like in terms of light waves at that perspective is that it is bent below the water. It is an optical illusion dependant on an perciever. The straw is not bent so it must be incorrect. It is caused by refraction. It's dependent on a reference point. There doesn't have to be a person at the reference point. And there's always a reference point. In terms of lightwaves, the straw IS bent at that reference point. Again, it's a conceptual error to believe that there's a preferred reference point (or set of them), or to believe that "no reference point" is a possible option. It's always a matter of the straw's properties, at reference point r (or points) x, in q respect. The straw's properties, at reference point r, with respect to the lightwaves at r, is that it's bent in the liquid. That's no illusion. That's really what it's like at reference point r with respect to lightwaves. This is an extremely important thing to understand, as it's the case with everything in the world, and understanding it dismantles a lot of confusion, including the supposed "hard problem" of consciousness. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 11:36:57 GMT
It's important to remember that naive realism is a theory of perception. Perception requires a brain. It's something our brains do. Naive realism isn't a theory of non-perception. Then how would you discern naive realism from indirect realism? What is the core difference between them? Direct realism is a philosophy of perception stance. It's a claim about how perception works. Indirect realism is a combination of a philosophy of perception stance--it's representationalist on perception, plus a theoretical belief about ontology--that there are external-to-oneself objects in the world. Of course, direct realists believe that there are external-to-oneself objects in the world, too--otherwise the perceptual stance wouldn't even make sense as presented, but the "realism" part of "direct realism" is present in the sense of a given (for the stance to even make sense), whereas the realism part of indirect realism is only present as a theoretical construct. |
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Post by PanLeo on Jun 2, 2017 11:45:36 GMT
It is an optical illusion dependant on an perciever. The straw is not bent so it must be incorrect. It is caused by refraction. It's dependent on a reference point. There doesn't have to be a person at the reference point. And there's always a reference point. In terms of lightwaves, the straw IS bent at that reference point. Again, it's a conceptual error to believe that there's a preferred reference point (or set of them), or to believe that "no reference point" is a possible option. It's always a matter of the straw's properties, at reference point r (or points) x, in q respect. The straw's properties, at reference point r, with respect to the lightwaves at r, is that it's bent in the liquid. That's no illusion. That's really what it's like at reference point r with respect to lightwaves. This is an extremely important thing to understand, as it's the case with everything in the world, and understanding it dismantles a lot of confusion, including the supposed "hard problem" of consciousness. That is like saying there Doesnt have to be a person at reference point x for there to be a person at a reference point x. I see no reason to think an optical illusion caused by failings in the eye is not dependant on it. That is only how it appears to us. It is like claiming that if you look through a glass with peanut butter on it that the thing you would be looking at if the peanut butter was wiped away is actually peanut butter. This absurd to me. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 11:55:49 GMT
It's dependent on a reference point. There doesn't have to be a person at the reference point. And there's always a reference point. In terms of lightwaves, the straw IS bent at that reference point. Again, it's a conceptual error to believe that there's a preferred reference point (or set of them), or to believe that "no reference point" is a possible option. It's always a matter of the straw's properties, at reference point r (or points) x, in q respect. The straw's properties, at reference point r, with respect to the lightwaves at r, is that it's bent in the liquid. That's no illusion. That's really what it's like at reference point r with respect to lightwaves. This is an extremely important thing to understand, as it's the case with everything in the world, and understanding it dismantles a lot of confusion, including the supposed "hard problem" of consciousness. That is like saying there Doesnt have to be a person at reference point x for there to be a person at a reference point x. I see no reason to think an optical illusion caused by failings in the eye is not dependant on it. That is only how it appears to us. It is like claiming that if you look through a glass with peanut butter on it that the thing you would be looking at if the peanut butter was wiped away is actually peanut butter. This absurd to me. "That is like saying there Doesnt have to be a person at reference point x for there to be a person at a reference point x. " No, it isn't. It's like saying that there doesn't have to be a person at a reference point for there to be a reference point. And there doesn't. And that's what I said because of that. A reference point is simply a spatio-temporal point. There do not need to be persons for there to be spatio-temporal points. "I see no reason to think an optical illusion caused by failings in the eye is not dependant on it." I don't know what "it" is there, exactly (there being a person who has an eye?). At any rate, I'd agree that an optical illusion cause by "failings in the eye"--whatever an example of one would be, if there are examples--is dependent on there being a consciously aware creature with an eye. It's just that the straw example isn't an example of this. Maybe there's an example. I don't know. I don't really catalog optical illusions and haven't bothered with them in any detail in some time. "It is like claiming that if you look through a glass with peanut butter on it that the thing you would be looking at if the peanut butter was wiped away is actually peanut butter." That doesn't even make much sense to me to comment on it, but why you'd have trouble understanding that lightwaves at particular spatio-temporal points are such that straws look bent at that point, I don't know. It seems like something very simple to understand to me. I can't imagine kindergarteners having much problem with it even. |
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Post by PanLeo on Jun 2, 2017 11:59:58 GMT
That is like saying there Doesnt have to be a person at reference point x for there to be a person at a reference point x. I see no reason to think an optical illusion caused by failings in the eye is not dependant on it. That is only how it appears to us. It is like claiming that if you look through a glass with peanut butter on it that the thing you would be looking at if the peanut butter was wiped away is actually peanut butter. This absurd to me. "It's like saying that there doesn't have to be a person at a reference point for there to be a reference point. And there doesn't. And that's what I said because of that. A reference point is simply a spatio-temporal point. There do not need to be persons for there to be spatio-temporal points" " That doesn't even make much sense to me to comment on it, but why you'd have trouble understanding that lightwaves at particular spatio-temporal points are such that straws look bent at that point, I don't know. It seems like something very simple to understand to me. I can't imagine kindergarteners having much problem with it even" I agree with all of this so I have no idea why you think I disagree with it. Nothing in my posts suggests I dont agree with this. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 12:03:15 GMT
"It's like saying that there doesn't have to be a person at a reference point for there to be a reference point. And there doesn't. And that's what I said because of that. A reference point is simply a spatio-temporal point. There do not need to be persons for there to be spatio-temporal points" " That doesn't even make much sense to me to comment on it, but why you'd have trouble understanding that lightwaves at particular spatio-temporal points are such that straws look bent at that point, I don't know. It seems like something very simple to understand to me. I can't imagine kindergarteners having much problem with it even" I agree with all of this so I have no idea why you think I disagree with it. If you agree with it then you agree that it's not like saying that there doesn't have to be a person at a reference point for there to be a person at a reference point, for one. |
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Post by faustus5 on Jun 2, 2017 12:05:53 GMT
Can you give me an example of a scientific program that was only successful because the scientists assumed physicalism was true?
How about: every single one. |
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Post by Deleted on Jun 2, 2017 12:07:21 GMT
Then how would you discern naive realism from indirect realism? What is the core difference between them? Direct realism is a philosophy of perception stance. It's a claim about how perception works. Indirect realism is a combination of a philosophy of perception stance--it's representationalist on perception, plus a theoretical belief about ontology--that there are external-to-oneself objects in the world. Of course, direct realists believe that there are external-to-oneself objects in the world, too--otherwise the perceptual stance wouldn't even make sense as presented, but the "realism" part of "direct realism" is present in the sense of a given (for the stance to even make sense), whereas the realism part of indirect realism is only present as a theoretical construct. Thanks for explaining. I always saw naive realism as the common sense view that things are seen directly. The case of the straw in the drink is the case in the same way placing tinted cellophane over a window would make everything outside the window appear purple. With indirect realism there is an intermediary between the thing in itself and the perceiver. That being the unconscious mind which does all the editing and filling in and created a new picture. Sort of like the newest smartphone takes great pics but the pics aren't the thing being taken.  So it isn't direct but it can be described as realism in that it was shaped by evolution to do what it does and can be assumed it is working well enough most of the time. And the same would be true of naive realism since other organisms have worse or better perception than others. Removing the middle-subconscious mind part would turn it into direct realism and not indirect. Other than that I can't see any difference between the two. |
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Post by PanLeo on Jun 2, 2017 12:11:37 GMT
"It's like saying that there doesn't have to be a person at a reference point for there to be a reference point. And there doesn't. And that's what I said because of that. A reference point is simply a spatio-temporal point. There do not need to be persons for there to be spatio-temporal points" " That doesn't even make much sense to me to comment on it, but why you'd have trouble understanding that lightwaves at particular spatio-temporal points are such that straws look bent at that point, I don't know. It seems like something very simple to understand to me. I can't imagine kindergarteners having much problem with it even" I agree with all of this so I have no idea why you think I disagree with it. If you agree with it then you agree that it's not like saying that there doesn't have to be a person at a reference point for there to be a person at a reference point, for one. Maybe I misinterpreted you. I thought you were making a similar argument to those that believe colour (the visual experience( is not mind-dependant. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 12:16:31 GMT
Direct realism is a philosophy of perception stance. It's a claim about how perception works. Indirect realism is a combination of a philosophy of perception stance--it's representationalist on perception, plus a theoretical belief about ontology--that there are external-to-oneself objects in the world. Of course, direct realists believe that there are external-to-oneself objects in the world, too--otherwise the perceptual stance wouldn't even make sense as presented, but the "realism" part of "direct realism" is present in the sense of a given (for the stance to even make sense), whereas the realism part of indirect realism is only present as a theoretical construct. Thanks for explaining. I always saw naive realism as the common sense view that things are seen directly. The case of the straw in the drink is the case in the same way placing tinted cellophane over a window would make everything outside the window appear purple. With indirect realism there is an intermediatory between the thing in itself and the perceiver. That being the unconscious mind which does all the editing and filling in and created a new picture. Sort of like the newest smartphone takes great pics but the pics aren't the thing being taken. So it isn't direct but it can be described as realism in that it was shaped by evolution to do what it does and can be assumed it is working well enough most of the time. And the same would be true of naive realism since other organisms have worse or better perception than others. Removing the middle-subconscious mind part would turn it into direct realism and not indirect. Other than that I can't see any difference between the two. I don't like introducing the idea of a subconscious mind into it. One could be an indirect realist but not buy the idea of a subconscious mind. The "realist" part in both cases seems unnecessary to me, really, as long as we're talking about stances in philosophy of perception in any contemporary, conventional sense. That one believes that perception is occurring implies that (a) one believes one is receiving information external to oneself, and (b) that one's physiology, including one's brain, is processing that information. (a) means that any stance on perception is necessarily realist--otherwise we'd not be talking about perception per se (but maybe some illusion of it or whatever). The difference is simply whether one believes that one is perceiving externals themselves or whether one believes that one is "perceiving" mental images that are related to the externals in some unknown manner. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 2, 2017 12:41:02 GMT
Can you give me an example of a scientific program that was only successful because the scientists assumed physicalism was true?
How about: every single one. Why not be more specific though? You seem to be saying that a scientist who takes no stance on metaphysics and deals only with observable phenomena will never succeed at any scientific program. I just don't see why that would be the case. If you could say something like "If Alexander Fleming didn't accept that everything is physical, he never would have discovered penicillin because he needed this assumption in order to realise X" then I could maybe understand your point of view better. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 12:50:56 GMT
How about: every single one. Why not be more specific though? You seem to be saying that a scientist who takes no stance on metaphysics and deals only with observable phenomena will never succeed at any scientific program. I just don't see why that would be the case. If you could say something like "If Alexander Fleming didn't accept that everything is physical, he never would have discovered penicillin because he needed this assumption in order to realise X" then I could maybe understand your point of view better. Given that what we refer to by "physical" are things with location and extension and mass and so on, how would one even begin to do science under an assumption that one is dealing with nonphysical things? |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 12:56:02 GMT
Also, note that a common take on "physical"--although I like to distance myself from this, so I hesitate to bring it up--is to more or less identify it with the science of physics, if not science in general; at least in the sense of what an ideal physics would encompass.
So also if one looks at "physical" that way, it's difficult to say how we'd begin doing science an on assumption that the world isn't physical. That would seem rather contradictory in that case.
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 2, 2017 12:59:46 GMT
Why not be more specific though? You seem to be saying that a scientist who takes no stance on metaphysics and deals only with observable phenomena will never succeed at any scientific program. I just don't see why that would be the case. If you could say something like "If Alexander Fleming didn't accept that everything is physical, he never would have discovered penicillin because he needed this assumption in order to realise X" then I could maybe understand your point of view better. Given that what we refer to by "physical" are things with location and extension and mass and so on, how would one even begin to do science under an assumption that one is dealing with nonphysical things? Sure but idealists and panpsychists and dualists and neutral monists don't deny location, mass and extension etc exist. They would disagree on what exactly gives rise to them but that seems to me beyond the purview of science and does not affect our ability to do science. But correct me if I'm wrong here. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 13:09:06 GMT
Sure but idealists and panpsychists and dualists and neutral monists don't deny location, mass and extension etc exist. They would disagree on what exactly gives rise to them but that seems to me beyond the purview of science and does not affect our ability to do science. But correct me if I'm wrong here. We should want to clarify what an idealist is even talking about when they talk about location, mass, extension, etc. though. Those are physical properties. I'm not at all of the belief that what people say isn't stupid, incoherent, etc. just because they say it, even if they're well-respected philosophers (or scientists or whatever). And I'm especially not of that belief publicly any longer now that I couldn't care less about having a career in philosophy. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 2, 2017 13:29:37 GMT
We should want to clarify what an idealist is even talking about when they talk about location, mass, extension, etc. though. Those are physical properties. What do you make of Berkely's discussion of such things in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge? Obviously he's only really looking at the basic Newtonian physics of his day but it's maybe a first step towards an idealistic conception of science. But idealists aside (as they're the most extreme case), how about dualists? They can presumably still do science pretty effectively as they don't deny that mass and extension are physical properties. I think these things are so beyond commonplace considerations that I would hesitate to think anyone stupid when they discuss such matters. I mean I find Dennett's dismissal of qualia very hard to accept, but I also think he's extremely intelligent and the fault may well be mine rather than his. At any rate, I'm grateful you've been civil and patient with me thus far! I did wonder if you were a professional philosopher, you certainly seem well-educated on the topic (as do faustus5 and Falconia). It's something I considered getting into myself, but I'm not sure I'm up to it. At any rate I only have a bachelor's degree so it would be a while before I could even consider it seriously. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 14:02:36 GMT
We should want to clarify what an idealist is even talking about when they talk about location, mass, extension, etc. though. Those are physical properties. What do you make of Berkely's discussion of such things in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge? Obviously he's only really looking at the basic Newtonian physics of his day but it's maybe a first step towards an idealistic conception of science. But idealists aside (as they're the most extreme case), how about dualists? They can presumably still do science pretty effectively as they don't deny that mass and extension are physical properties. I think these things are so beyond commonplace considerations that I would hesitate to think anyone stupid when they discuss such matters. I mean I find Dennett's dismissal of qualia very hard to accept, but I also think he's extremely intelligent and the fault may well be mine rather than his. At any rate, I'm grateful you've been civil and patient with me thus far! I did wonder if you were a professional philosopher, you certainly seem well-educated on the topic (as do faustus5 and Falconia). It's something I considered getting into myself, but I'm not sure I'm up to it. At any rate I only have a bachelor's degree so it would be a while before I could even consider it seriously. It's been so long since I've read Berkeley that I'd have to reread him to comment in any detail. When I paid the most attention to him was when I was an early undergraduate in philosophy and I had one of those moments akin to when I first discovered religious beliefs in any detail--namely, it was basically my introduction to idealism and I was completely dumbfounded by the idea that anyone took the notion seriously. My opinion of that didn't improve as I read Berkeley, but again, I'd have to reread stuff to comment in any detail. Re dualists, sure, but insofar as they'd be doing science, they're taking things to be physical. Most dualists aren't doing science about mind, as they think the idea is a non-starter. "I think these things are so beyond commonplace considerations that I would hesitate to think anyone stupid when they discuss such matters. I mean I find Dennett's dismissal of qualia very hard to accept, but I also think he's extremely intelligent and the fault may well be mine rather than his." I don't think that. My view that a lot of stuff that is said is stupid comes from reading and interacting with people like Dennett in detail. I don't think that Dennett is a moron overall or anything. But I've long realized that no matter how smart some people are in general, no matter how educated they are in general, they can still have some effective "blind spots" where they are more or less incoherent or moronic, even when we're talking about things directly pertinent to their professional field and subdiscipline. In my view, philosophy is loaded with moronic arguments, unfortunately, and my view about that has only increased as I've dived into those arguments and interacted with people about them. Re philosophy, I have graduate degrees in it, and at one point I thought I might want to pursue it professionally, but I've long been a professional musician (and I also have graduate degrees in music theory/composition--which I obtained prior to my philosophy degrees). I'm in my 50s already. I'm not going to pursue a career in philosophy at this point (and it would probably be futile to attempt to, given the time that has passed since I obtained my degrees and given that I'm a white male--because of EEO policies and the like, it's easiest (though still not easy) to get a philosophy job if you're a female, especially a minority female. This is moreso the case in philosophy than some other fields, because philosophy has been so white male dominated in the west overall). |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 2, 2017 14:55:11 GMT
It's been so long since I've read Berkeley that I'd have to reread him to comment in any detail. When I paid the most attention to him was when I was an early undergraduate in philosophy and I had one of those moments akin to when I first discovered religious beliefs in any detail--namely, it was basically my introduction to idealism and I was completely dumbfounded by the idea that anyone took the notion seriously. My opinion of that didn't improve as I read Berkeley, but again, I'd have to reread stuff to comment in any detail. Berkeley's stance is we can study phenomena and any underlying cause we find will simply be more phenomena which we can study and make predictions about. Meaning science, for all intents and purposes, would be identical whether we believed in matter or not. You might not subscribe to Berkeleyan idealism (and for the record I don't either), but it's hard to see a fault with his reasoning here. Whatever the presumed metaphysics, the phenomena and our ability to make predictions about them won't change. Well then, dualism at least can be pondered on without any danger to science. Same with idealism if we accept Berkeley's argument. Panpsychism and neutral monism also would seem to allow for studies of the traditional "physical" properties as well. Are there any philopsophers you consider to have few (or perhaps no) blind spots? Yeah that's definitely the case from what I've observed. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 2, 2017 15:01:05 GMT
It's been so long since I've read Berkeley that I'd have to reread him to comment in any detail. When I paid the most attention to him was when I was an early undergraduate in philosophy and I had one of those moments akin to when I first discovered religious beliefs in any detail--namely, it was basically my introduction to idealism and I was completely dumbfounded by the idea that anyone took the notion seriously. My opinion of that didn't improve as I read Berkeley, but again, I'd have to reread stuff to comment in any detail. Berkeley's stance is we can study phenomena and any underlying cause we find will simply be more phenomena which we can study and make predictions about. Meaning science, for all intents and purposes, would be identical whether we believed in matter or not. You might not subscribe to Berkeleyan idealism (and for the record I don't either), but it's hard to see a fault with his reasoning here. Whatever the presumed metaphysics, the phenomena and our ability to make predictions about them won't change. Well then, dualism at least can be pondered on without any danger to science. Same with idealism if we accept Berkeley's argument. Panpsychism and neutral monism also would seem to allow for studies of the traditional "physical" properties as well. Are there any philopsophers you consider to have few (or perhaps no) blind spots? Yeah that's definitely the case from what I've observed. Re Berkeley, in order to be making predictions about what happens when force A acts on B, say, we have to have some idea what we're even referring to by "force," by A acting on B, etc. So what would he be referring to? |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 2, 2017 15:34:46 GMT
Re Berkeley, in order to be making predictions about what happens when force A acts on B, say, we have to have some idea what we're even referring to by "force," by A acting on B, etc. So what would he be referring to? I'll have to take another look about what Berkeley himself said, but I would imagine you simply define a force as a thing that affects the phenomena we perceive. So with the gravitational force the Earth exerts on the moon, we could define it as "that which causes the phenomena of the moon to be attracted towards the phenomena of the Earth." From this we could make embellishments like "that which we perceive as more massive is perceived as having a greater attractive force". Sure, it's cumbersome compared to "more massive objects attract less massive objects" but functionally it still does the job. And of course, in general parlance, an idealist can still talk of "massive objects" even if they think ultimately that mass is a property bestowed by the observer rather than a property of the thing in itself. |
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