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Post by Toasted Cheese on May 31, 2017 23:11:10 GMT
Ok I see your distinction, but I'm not sure I agree with you that the very idea of non-physical existents is incoherent. What makes it so? What do you define as "physical" and why is its coherency assured? Maybe we need our own thread for this! I think a better topic to head line this thread woud be: Is physicality just an illusion? I liked reading your responses and explanations to Terrapin Station. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 1, 2017 10:20:32 GMT
I think a better topic to head line this thread woud be: Is physicality just an illusion? I wouldn't be so bold as to claim the physical is an illusion. I just think statements like "The physical is a coherent concept" and "Nothing beyond the physical is a coherent concept" are unsubstantiated. Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. If we allow that such a substance exists for pragmatic reasons (it's a lot easier to think of "Bob seeing an apple", as opposed to thinking "If Bob is standing in an orchard on an autumn day he will experience apple-y sense-data") then we open the door for speculation on other potential substances. We can of course use other philosophical tools to eliminate these other substances (some argue Occam's Razor is a good reason to do so for instance), but the reason why we do so is not because the physical is coherent and they are not. |
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Post by faustus5 on Jun 1, 2017 10:45:13 GMT
It was a very good question, one that you don't know how to answer, because you don't see the bigger picture. No, it was a bad question. I see the bigger picture just fine. I just have no tolerance for vague bullshit that has no connection to evidence-based thinking. This bizarre question has nothing to do with anything that is being discussed in this thread nor anything I've posted. You've jumped the shark. |
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Post by faustus5 on Jun 1, 2017 10:56:41 GMT
Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. Yeah, let's throw out centuries of progress in the sciences in favor of floppy mystical philosophy which doesn't allow us to do anything that is of any use to a single human being, just because a minority of philosophers think that their ability to imagine we live in the Matrix means something important. No, it doesn't mean anything important. One's ability to imagine alternatives to the consensus is meaningless unless it is backed up by a viable research program. |
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Post by Toasted Cheese on Jun 1, 2017 11:14:46 GMT
It was a very good question, one that you don't know how to answer, because you don't see the bigger picture. No, it was a bad question. I see the bigger picture just fine. I just have no tolerance for vague bullshit that has no connection to evidence-based thinking. This bizarre question has nothing to do with anything that is being discussed in this thread nor anything I've posted. You've jumped the shark. If you can't see a purpose in your life, or take responsibility for your life, then I would then say you do live your life in a state of constant flux. Why are you attempting to justify your limitations, they are transparent to me. Do you wish to keep them? You are also playing devil's advocate by twisting around something that has obviously pushed a button with you, by claiming it has noting to do with what is being discussed. It has plenty to do with it. Does arrogance often force you to go into denial? |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 1, 2017 11:21:35 GMT
Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. Yeah, let's throw out centuries of progress in the sciences in favor of floppy mystical philosophy which doesn't allow us to do anything that is of any use to a single human being, just because a minority of philosophers think that their ability to imagine we live in the Matrix means something important. No, it doesn't mean anything important. One's ability to imagine alternatives to the consensus is meaningless unless it is backed up by a viable research program. Who's talking about throwing out science? Phenomenalism is perfectly compatible with science. I also said there are pragmatic reasons to presume the physical exists. My only real issue is this insistence that physicalism should be accepted over alternatives because it is coherent and they are not.
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Post by Toasted Cheese on Jun 1, 2017 11:31:12 GMT
I think a better topic to head line this thread woud be: Is physicality just an illusion? I just think statements like "The physical is a coherent concept" and "Nothing beyond the physical is a coherent concept" are unsubstantiated. Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. If we allow that such a substance exists for pragmatic reasons (it's a lot easier to think of "Bob seeing an apple", as opposed to thinking "If Bob is standing in an orchard on an autumn day he will experience apple-y sense-data") then we open the door for speculation on other potential substances. We can of course use other philosophical tools to eliminate these other substances (some argue Occam's Razor is a good reason to do so for instance), but the reason why we do so is not because the physical is coherent and they are not. It could make for an interesting discussion. Perhaps boldness is what is required. I find that discussions on these threads often tend to get over intellectualized as well, as though posters are attempting to impress upon how much philosophy or science they know, when they are just being pretentious. The physical is real concept for many and that is what the organism of our human bodies and lives represent for most without wanting or caring to go deeper. Perhaps this is seen as too confronting for many. The physical is only one side of the coin though. Flip it and you have the other side, which is consciousness awareness. At the end of the day though, be it heads or tails, one is still left with same change and that is the whole. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 1, 2017 11:50:06 GMT
I find that discussions on these threads often tend to get over intellectualized as well, as though posters are attempting to impress upon how much philosophy or science they know, when they are just being pretentious. Suppose I can't comment, I'm as guilty of that as anyone! The contention would be that the two are not truly separate though, merely two ways of representing the same thing. Consciousness could be a completely physical process - I don't rule that out at all. I just don't think it's possible to say for certain it is. It seems impossible to be objective about something so subjective. Attempts to do so either deliberately leave aspects of consciousness out (eg Dennett's dismissal of qualia) or make unfalsifiable assumptions about them (eg those who equate qualia to brain activity). However, I find the other extremes of saying there is more than the physical or even that the physical does not exist at all equally problematic. None of these claims seems falsifiable and many of them are very unwieldy. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 1, 2017 14:09:26 GMT
We certainly agree on that, it just doesn't change the physical facts of the world (and that is itself a physical fact). And there are only physical facts. And it doesn't change the "spiritual"— for want of a better term—aspects of your inner being, that many dismiss due to attachments of this physical realm. Attachment to the physical, is all about fear and desperation, and brings forth the conflict and suffering that is perpetuated onto the billions of lives living on this planet. It is after all impermanent, so what is a physical fact anyway, perhaps just a construct of the ego mind? Our beliefs and so-called facts come from this mind and how is that physical? Your mind is your brain functioning in particular ways. And yes, facts are impermanent. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 1, 2017 14:14:23 GMT
I think a better topic to head line this thread woud be: Is physicality just an illusion? I wouldn't be so bold as to claim the physical is an illusion. I just think statements like "The physical is a coherent concept" and "Nothing beyond the physical is a coherent concept" are unsubstantiated. Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. If we allow that such a substance exists for pragmatic reasons (it's a lot easier to think of "Bob seeing an apple", as opposed to thinking "If Bob is standing in an orchard on an autumn day he will experience apple-y sense-data") then we open the door for speculation on other potential substances. We can of course use other philosophical tools to eliminate these other substances (some argue Occam's Razor is a good reason to do so for instance), but the reason why we do so is not because the physical is coherent and they are not. The way to "substantiate" the coherence of the notion of nonphysical existents is to present a coherent account of what the heck nonphysical existents would be. What would some properties of them be? What would count as evidence of them? Etc. And sense data theories are not at all a given. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 1, 2017 14:17:56 GMT
I find that discussions on these threads often tend to get over intellectualized as well, as though posters are attempting to impress upon how much philosophy or science they know, when they are just being pretentious. Suppose I can't comment, I'm as guilty of that as anyone! This is the philosophy board. Should we restrict ourselves to an assumption that no one participating has any formal education in philosophy? That would seem ridiculous to me. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 1, 2017 14:22:32 GMT
In my view it's impossible for people to be objective period. That's a category error. And re falsifiability, we're doing philosophy, not science. Of course, ideally we want to tackle these issues scientifically, too, but our context here is philosophy, not science. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 1, 2017 14:46:58 GMT
The way to "substantiate" the coherence of the notion of nonphysical existents is to present a coherent account of what the heck nonphysical existents would be. What would some properties of them be? What would count as evidence of them? Etc. But isn't the same true of the physical? What would count as evidence of the physical existing beyond sense-data? What are the properties of the physical beyond sense-data? My stance is not so much that these rivals to physicalism are coherent, it's that physicalism fares no better in the coherency stakes. Would you mind elaborating? If sense-data cannot be taken as a given, then it seems even more difficult to see how the physical can be taken as such. Ok, so if everything is subjective, how can we really discuss existence on any meaningful level anyway? Sure but if a theory can't be falsified, it hurts us accepting it as correct (and a logical positivist might consider them not even worth consideration - not that I'm a logical positivist). |
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Post by general313 on Jun 1, 2017 15:17:03 GMT
I think a better topic to head line this thread woud be: Is physicality just an illusion? I wouldn't be so bold as to claim the physical is an illusion. I just think statements like "The physical is a coherent concept" and "Nothing beyond the physical is a coherent concept" are unsubstantiated. Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. If we allow that such a substance exists for pragmatic reasons (it's a lot easier to think of "Bob seeing an apple", as opposed to thinking "If Bob is standing in an orchard on an autumn day he will experience apple-y sense-data") then we open the door for speculation on other potential substances. We can of course use other philosophical tools to eliminate these other substances (some argue Occam's Razor is a good reason to do so for instance), but the reason why we do so is not because the physical is coherent and they are not. I'm willing to take a look at "other substances" as soon as there is some backing evidence. I'm unaware of any. |
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Post by general313 on Jun 1, 2017 15:18:46 GMT
In my view it's impossible for people to be objective period. That's a category error. And re falsifiability, we're doing philosophy, not science. Of course, ideally we want to tackle these issues scientifically, too, but our context here is philosophy, not science. Not just ideally. If you separate philosophy from science all you have left is mental masturbation. |
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Post by general313 on Jun 1, 2017 15:23:32 GMT
I find that discussions on these threads often tend to get over intellectualized as well, as though posters are attempting to impress upon how much philosophy or science they know, when they are just being pretentious. Suppose I can't comment, I'm as guilty of that as anyone! That should be irrelevant though. If we don't get side tracked with fallacious thinking, we can use logic, reason and evidence to guide the discussion. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 1, 2017 15:38:26 GMT
I wouldn't be so bold as to claim the physical is an illusion. I just think statements like "The physical is a coherent concept" and "Nothing beyond the physical is a coherent concept" are unsubstantiated. Since we can only know of sense-data, to assume an underlying substance which we cannot refer to aside of sense-data seems pretty incoherent to me. If we allow that such a substance exists for pragmatic reasons (it's a lot easier to think of "Bob seeing an apple", as opposed to thinking "If Bob is standing in an orchard on an autumn day he will experience apple-y sense-data") then we open the door for speculation on other potential substances. We can of course use other philosophical tools to eliminate these other substances (some argue Occam's Razor is a good reason to do so for instance), but the reason why we do so is not because the physical is coherent and they are not. I'm willing to take a look at "other substances" as soon as there is some backing evidence. I'm unaware of any. My point is there's not evidence for any supposed substances, including the physical. We know only that we gather sense-data. Physicalism suggests there is a physical substance that gives rise to this sense-data but any evidence we would seek to gather for this substance would merely be more sense data.
Put it another way, George Berkeley, Rene Descartes and Gilbert Ryle all enter a room to see an apple sitting on a table. Descartes: "Aha, I perceive an apple. Perceiving and the thing perceived are different so there are two substances at work here: the mind which perceives and matter which is perceived!" Berkeley: "Why complicate matters? Could you even describe the apple independent of your perceiving it? Only perception itself exists. There is only one substance: mind!" Ryle: "Don't be absurd! You're making a mistake thinking of perceiving and the thing perceived as separate. The apple is a physical entity and your perceiving it is the physical experience of physical things in your body doing what they do. Only matter exists!"
Based on the evidence of perceiving an apple, any of them could be right. Meaning we can either take a phenomenalist stance and say it doesn't really matter who's right about metaphysical substances only that we get sense-data of an apple (something all 3 would agree on); or we can take a pragmatic approach and decide which one of the three stances (or perhaps another stance altogether) is the most useful and go with that one.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 1, 2017 15:42:36 GMT
The way to "substantiate" the coherence of the notion of nonphysical existents is to present a coherent account of what the heck nonphysical existents would be. What would some properties of them be? What would count as evidence of them? Etc. But isn't the same true of the physical? What would count as evidence of the physical existing beyond sense-data? What are the properties of the physical beyond sense-data? My stance is not so much that these rivals to physicalism are coherent, it's that physicalism fares no better in the coherency stakes. Would you mind elaborating? If sense-data cannot be taken as a given, then it seems even more difficult to see how the physical can be taken as such. Ok, so if everything is subjective, how can we really discuss existence on any meaningful level anyway? Sure but if a theory can't be falsified, it hurts us accepting it as correct (and a logical positivist might consider them not even worth consideration - not that I'm a logical positivist). You ignored my last attempt to sort out one thing at a time, but hopefully you won't ignore this one. First, "sense data theories are not a given." I didn't say "sense data is not a given" (although I would say that, but not in that way because it would cause confusion). I said, "sense data theories are not a given." Sense data are different than sense data theories. Are you saying that you were unaware that some people reject the notion of parsing subjective experience in terms of sense data? I just want to clarify that so we know where to start. |
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Post by Terrapin Station on Jun 1, 2017 15:45:13 GMT
In my view it's impossible for people to be objective period. That's a category error. And re falsifiability, we're doing philosophy, not science. Of course, ideally we want to tackle these issues scientifically, too, but our context here is philosophy, not science. Not just ideally. If you separate philosophy from science all you have left is mental masturbation. If you don't separate philosophy from science, you'll have tremendous confusion regarding just what is going on that's different in philosophy classrooms versus science classrooms, and/or why something different is going on. The same would go for trying to figure out what makes philosophy and science texts/books different, just what the difference would be between science and philosophy of science, etc. |
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Post by The Lost One on Jun 1, 2017 16:08:16 GMT
You ignored my last attempt to sort out one thing at a time, but hopefully you won't ignore this one. I didn't actually although I don't think I quoted you in my response so you might have missed it. But we'll try again sure. No, I am aware some reject it though I admit I'm not all that familiar with the arguments against it. Which argument(s) against it would you endorse? |
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