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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 7:20:32 GMT
What is your game? Are you really what you claim to be? No, you plugged numbers, for a result we already knew, into the formula for Bayes' Theorem. That is incredibly easy. You did not show your work in obtaining the numbers, as I did. Remember now? P(B 1 through 3). That would be honest. It's not like we couldn't solve the problem and were crying, "What ever will we do?" Then you came to the rescue with Bayes' Theorem. We already knew the answer. When the host picks the cards they're face up to him. You make a good point though. Bayes' Theorem is not useful most of the time. In some cases when the answer has already been found it might help convince advocates of Bayes' Theorem, who are not very bright, I've noticed. If people understand the problem well enough to use Bayes' Theorem, they don't really need to know that theorem. You can't know your specific scenario will even fit Bayes' till you solve it first. Witness when there are more than three doors. I think the most valuable lesson here is that people who have poor abilities to communicate in English expect to be taken more seriously if they doll it up with mathematical language. That won't work unless you know the English that got you there. Oh wait, it might work on Democrats. What did I claim to be? Dude, I "showed my work" for both problems. I wrote out the entirety of the theorem and what each number was. I don't know how else I'm supposed to "show my work." Your "shown work" was wrong anyway, as P(B|~A) is either .33 or .5, not .66 as you said. How about you explain what you think is "hairy" about your 100-door version. I mean, there's only 4 numbers, and 3 are the same for both versions. In both, P(A) and P(~A) are 50/50. For "50/50" you can use .33/.33, .01/.01, .66/.66... it doesn't matter, they all get the same result. In both, P(B|A) is 1. The only difference is P(B|~A). In both cases, that number is 1/(doors-1). In the 3-door version it's 1/2, in the 100-door version it's 1/99, in a 3748-door version, it's 1/3747. Pretty simple. Yep, Bayes's Theorem is so useless it was used the crack the Enigma Code and hunt down Russian Submarines in the Cold War... not to mention it's the backbone of most modern AIs and stuff like spam filtering. Yep, totally useless. When we eventually invent AIs running Solomonoff Induction/Bayes's Theorem solving all kinds of problems for us, it'll be useless then too. This is not my job. It is not my hobby. I do not believe it has real value. Obviously you spend far more time on it than I do. I suspect because you think it has more value than it does, or you gamble too much. The defenders of Bayes' Theorem that agreed with your overrating of it are gone. That is except "gadreel" whom I have long suspected is your sock. AJ has to study it for his goals in school, but I think he realizes that real life does not employ the theorem very often. The taxicab problem is not real and it shows terribly. If taxicab companies are really different and they use the same makes and models of vehicles and you can't tell one from another they would add markings or equipment of some kind so that you can tell. That's just common sense. A statistical assessment adequate to be meaningful of only one person's color detection is going to be beyond the time, expense and usefulness for any court's resources. It would probably show a binary condition anyway, can or can't distinguish the colors. The taxicab problem is for people with no common sense. Again you do not show your work when you list the theorem's "historic" accomplishments. Using Bayes' for more than three doors probably requires a different approach. Choosing doors 2 through 99 is not really a single event. Thus it requires extensive calculations. To get a single event, instead of using the chance the host opens doors 2 through 99 you need to use the chance he does not open door 3. Then you ask what is the chance the host does not open door 3 (event B) given that the prize is behind door three (event A), which rather obviously is P=1, whatever your English skills. Now you need the chance the prize is anywhere else which is 1/3, and simply subtract it. Notice this does not require Bayes' Theorem and is exactly what I said before I ever heard of Bayes' Theorem, and it works for any number of doors. A very serious problem in the world today is the large number of people more fond of science than capable of it. They believe it has been successfully applied far beyond where it has been successfully applied. You are a shining example of them. When I searched "Monty Bayes'" I got sites that, surprise, did not give any proper solution like the one I showed. I suspect you copied and pasted from one of those. Several sites list incorrect explanations for many things including the twin paradox. I believe it's a trap so your professors can spot copying and pasting rather easily.
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Post by general313 on Feb 18, 2020 16:36:22 GMT
Glad we agree on the "philosophical position" point. The difficulty with philosophy is that it's more slippery than science, in the same way that religion is. At least philosophy is more grounded in rationalism, yet there are multiple schools, again like religion. My point in raising Einstein's imagination is not to dispute Bayes per se, other than to show it's not a universal path to discovery. I think Bayes may be useful to describe how the brain works, but there's a lot more. Deep learning, for instance, is helping us understand how the brain works, and mapping is an important aspect of it. Our brains have the ability to use mapping to not only solve mazes, but also deal with complex social situations. Interestingly enough, Einstein probably shared the view that the "stupid version" (I'll use your terminology here) of QM got interpreted first, much to his lament. I think I share the feeling that there's something wrong about the Copenhagen interpretation, but I'm not enough of an expert to be certain about it, so I think the "shut-up and calculate" camp is a sensible approach until we can devise experiments that shed more light. One reason for my resistance to proclaiming Bayes as the unifying principle of all science is that I never heard it in my university education where I took many classes in theoretical physics, chemistry and electrical engineering, with good coverage of the history of those sciences. Now it's possible that in the 40 years since I took those classes there has been a fundamental change in these sciences, where Bayes has taken a central role, but I doubt it. I read many science journals, none of which have reported anything like that. I agree about philosophy, which is why we need a rigorously defined epistemology (which I find Bayes/Solomonoff to be) and philosophers informed by science. Science may get along well (for the most part) without philosophy--much better than the reverse--but it would still be better off knowing the fundamentals of rationality. I also agree that Bayes isn't a universal path to discovery. It's very much like logic; logic is only as useful as the truth of the propositions we feed it. Likewise, Bayes is only as useful as the accuracy of our priors and the strength of the evidence. However, it's still important to correctly reason and update our beliefs based on new evidence, and the human brain is not innately good at this. In fact, as Aj_June posted HERE, the deviation from Bayes's Theorem in finance can be used to prove the existence of cognitive biases. I doubt if Bayes is taught as any "unifying principle" in science, because the way I'm talking about it is certainly more philosophical in nature. Again, I'd highly recommend reading through that Jaynes textbook as he offers dozens of examples from science, but also from everyday reasoning. Really, I'd say Bayes is more a fundamental principle of rationality; science works because the rationality of science is, essentially, Bayesian even when it isn't explicitly being used, if that makes sense. Einstein didn't like Copenhagen because he understood it would wreck General Relativity--GR is local, real, deterministic; Copenhagen is none of those. If we're being charitable, we might say Einstein deeply felt General Relativity was an accurate model of reality, so he equally felt Copenhagen couldn't be right; if we're being cynical, we might say Einstein was biased because he didn't WANT General Relativity to be wrong. Einstein devised the EPR experiment in an attempt to show what he thought was an absurdity about non-local causality under Copenhagen (basically, the ability of a measurement to affect another measurement at great distances from each other). He thought this proved there must be hidden variables. Unfortunately, Bell's Theorem later showed that no hidden variable theory could account for all the predictions of QM while maintaining locality, so many theorists have just been happy to abandon locality, either in the form of Copenhagen, or in the form of Bohm (which is a hidden variable interpretation). Hugh Everett didn't propose Many-Worlds until 2 years after Einstein's death. Basically, Everett just eliminated the "collapse" of Copenhagen and the "hidden variables" of Bohm and reduced QM to the wavefunction, making QM local, real, and deterministic (like General Relativity). For whatever reason, people don't like it because accepting it would mean that all the other states of the wavefunction, the "worlds," actually exist. I wonder what Einstein would've thought of MW, but it's too late to know now. I do think science depends on a small kernel of philosophy (if done right), to provide a frameworks sort of like the axioms in math and geometry. I think it should be minimized, just as reducing axioms to a bare minimum is an aim in math. I think of it as a bootstrap program used to boot up the full operating system for a computer. The bootstrap is made as small an simple as possible, as, especially in the early days of computing, it had to be entered manually via the computer's front panel. I may have to check out Jayne's book. Do he or she have a good writing style? I think Einstein's resistance to QM and Copenhagen in particular was much more than an insecurity about his theories of relativity. It seems to have been a deep-seated aesthetic disgust at the concept of indeterminacy. Even in his later years, after there were multiple and very solid confirmations of relativity, he remained opposed to Copenhagen, and in fact spent much of his later life trying to unify QM and relativity (unsuccessfully). It would be nice to know Einstein's reaction to MW. To me what is really weird (and really stretches credulity) about MW is that it seems to be a violation of conservation of energy. In ordinary everyday experience, any time we duplicate something, whether in the physical world or in software, extra resources are required to support the increased count of instances (material if physical, computer memory if in software). In a MW scenario (even if all the duplications happen at the beginning), to support the apparent astronomical number of parallel worlds would imply the existence of an astronomical amount of energy. This may be possible but it's quite mind-blowing. Yet if the extent of the observable universe as we understand it today were presented to the ancient Greeks, their minds would have been blown too. So who knows? By the way, interesting discussion!
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Post by goz on Feb 18, 2020 20:00:56 GMT
What did I claim to be? Dude, I "showed my work" for both problems. I wrote out the entirety of the theorem and what each number was. I don't know how else I'm supposed to "show my work." Your "shown work" was wrong anyway, as P(B|~A) is either .33 or .5, not .66 as you said. How about you explain what you think is "hairy" about your 100-door version. I mean, there's only 4 numbers, and 3 are the same for both versions. In both, P(A) and P(~A) are 50/50. For "50/50" you can use .33/.33, .01/.01, .66/.66... it doesn't matter, they all get the same result. In both, P(B|A) is 1. The only difference is P(B|~A). In both cases, that number is 1/(doors-1). In the 3-door version it's 1/2, in the 100-door version it's 1/99, in a 3748-door version, it's 1/3747. Pretty simple. Yep, Bayes's Theorem is so useless it was used the crack the Enigma Code and hunt down Russian Submarines in the Cold War... not to mention it's the backbone of most modern AIs and stuff like spam filtering. Yep, totally useless. When we eventually invent AIs running Solomonoff Induction/Bayes's Theorem solving all kinds of problems for us, it'll be useless then too. This is not my job. It is not my hobby. I do not believe it has real value. Obviously you spend far more time on it than I do. I suspect because you think it has more value than it does, or you gamble too much. The defenders of Bayes' Theorem that agreed with your overrating of it are gone. That is except "gadreel" whom I have long suspected is your sock. AJ has to study it for his goals in school, but I think he realizes that real life does not employ the theorem very often. The taxicab problem is not real and it shows terribly. If taxicab companies are really different and they use the same makes and models of vehicles and you can't tell one from another they would add markings or equipment of some kind so that you can tell. That's just common sense. A statistical assessment adequate to be meaningful of only one person's color detection is going to be beyond the time, expense and usefulness for any court's resources. It would probably show a binary condition anyway, can or can't distinguish the colors. The taxicab problem is for people with no common sense. Again you do not show your work when you list the theorem's "historic" accomplishments. Using Bayes' for more than three doors probably requires a different approach. Choosing doors 2 through 99 is not really a single event. Thus it requires extensive calculations. To get a single event, instead of using the chance the host opens doors 2 through 99 you need to use the chance he does not open door 3. Then you ask what is the chance the host does not open door 3 (event B) given that the prize is behind door three (event A), which rather obviously is P=1, whatever your English skills. Now you need the chance the prize is anywhere else which is 1/3, and simply subtract it. Notice this does not require Bayes' Theorem and is exactly what I said before I ever heard of Bayes' Theorem, and it works for any number of doors. A very serious problem in the world today is the large number of people more fond of science than capable of it. They believe it has been successfully applied far beyond where it has been successfully applied. You are a shining example of them. When I searched "Monty Bayes'" I got sites that, surprise, did not give any proper solution like the one I showed. I suspect you copied and pasted from one of those. Several sites list incorrect explanations for many things including the twin paradox. I believe it's a trap so your professors can spot copying and pasting rather easily. Please be aware that anyone who uses the term 'common sense' in any kind of statistical, philosophical, rational or scientific argument has already lost at the outset and shows what kind of idiot they are. ...whilst others are even less capable, rely on an admixture of half knowledge, 'common sense', antiquated text books, an overinflated sense of their own knowledge and a belief in an unproven and unlikely god figure that necessarily clouds every judgment.
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 22:12:50 GMT
This is not my job. It is not my hobby. I do not believe it has real value. Obviously you spend far more time on it than I do. I suspect because you think it has more value than it does, or you gamble too much. The defenders of Bayes' Theorem that agreed with your overrating of it are gone. That is except "gadreel" whom I have long suspected is your sock. AJ has to study it for his goals in school, but I think he realizes that real life does not employ the theorem very often. The taxicab problem is not real and it shows terribly. If taxicab companies are really different and they use the same makes and models of vehicles and you can't tell one from another they would add markings or equipment of some kind so that you can tell. That's just common sense. A statistical assessment adequate to be meaningful of only one person's color detection is going to be beyond the time, expense and usefulness for any court's resources. It would probably show a binary condition anyway, can or can't distinguish the colors. The taxicab problem is for people with no common sense. Again you do not show your work when you list the theorem's "historic" accomplishments. Using Bayes' for more than three doors probably requires a different approach. Choosing doors 2 through 99 is not really a single event. Thus it requires extensive calculations. To get a single event, instead of using the chance the host opens doors 2 through 99 you need to use the chance he does not open door 3. Then you ask what is the chance the host does not open door 3 (event B) given that the prize is behind door three (event A), which rather obviously is P=1, whatever your English skills. Now you need the chance the prize is anywhere else which is 1/3, and simply subtract it. Notice this does not require Bayes' Theorem and is exactly what I said before I ever heard of Bayes' Theorem, and it works for any number of doors. A very serious problem in the world today is the large number of people more fond of science than capable of it. They believe it has been successfully applied far beyond where it has been successfully applied. You are a shining example of them. When I searched "Monty Bayes'" I got sites that, surprise, did not give any proper solution like the one I showed. I suspect you copied and pasted from one of those. Several sites list incorrect explanations for many things including the twin paradox. I believe it's a trap so your professors can spot copying and pasting rather easily. Please be aware that anyone who uses the term 'common sense' in any kind of statistical, philosophical, rational or scientific argument has already lost at the outset and shows what kind of idiot they are. ...whilst others are even less capable, rely on an admixture of half knowledge, 'common sense', antiquated text books, an overinflated sense of their own knowledge and a belief in an unproven and unlikely god figure that necessarily clouds every judgment. Having neither made nor heard an actual argument in your life, how would you know?
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Post by goz on Feb 18, 2020 22:17:20 GMT
Please be aware that anyone who uses the term 'common sense' in any kind of statistical, philosophical, rational or scientific argument has already lost at the outset and shows what kind of idiot they are. ...whilst others are even less capable, rely on an admixture of half knowledge, 'common sense', antiquated text books, an overinflated sense of their own knowledge and a belief in an unproven and unlikely god figure that necessarily clouds every judgment. Having neither made nor heard an actual argument in your life, how would you know? How would you know that I have neither made nor heard an actual argument in my life?
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 22:17:32 GMT
What's really funny about that is the same argument can be used about the random assembly of life. Laboratories have been trying to find a random assembly of life, life from matter not alive, especially since Miller-Urey in the 1950s, and it hasn't happened. Now it can be argued just because life doesn't randomly assemble itself here on Earth doesn't mean it can't assemble itself on another planet. There are no claims that life generated this way either. It’s just an unproven hypothesis at this point. Where as theists will say absolutely God created life. It's the only one that held any hope. A lot of people say a lot of different things.
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 22:18:42 GMT
Having neither made nor heard an actual argument in your life, how would you know? How would you know that I have neither made nor heard an actual argument in my life? It shows. "I don't have to because peer review."
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Post by goz on Feb 18, 2020 22:21:21 GMT
How would you know that I have neither made nor heard an actual argument in my life? It shows. "I don't have to because peer review." What shows? What does this mean? How could you possibly know what I have done in my whole life?
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 22:23:41 GMT
It shows. "I don't have to because peer review."What shows? What does this mean? How could you possibly know what I have done in my whole life? It's my super power. I don't know what you've done in your "whole life" but I do have an idea how much good it has done you.
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Post by goz on Feb 18, 2020 22:26:53 GMT
What shows? What does this mean? How could you possibly know what I have done in my whole life? It's my super power. I don't know what you've done in your "whole life" but I do have an idea how much good it has done you. How can you? You speak nonsense as usual.
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 22:35:37 GMT
It's my super power. I don't know what you've done in your "whole life" but I do have an idea how much good it has done you. How can you? You speak nonsense as usual. How many years have you here counting the previous boards?
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Post by phludowin on Feb 18, 2020 23:01:15 GMT
Laboratories have been trying to find a random assembly of life, life from matter not alive, especially since Miller-Urey in the 1950s, and it hasn't happened. Now it can be argued just because life doesn't randomly assemble itself here on Earth doesn't mean it can't assemble itself on another planet. Laboratories also have never managed to create a volcano eruption or an earthquake. Does this mean that volcano eruptions and earthquakes don’t exist? Maybe according to cre(a)ti(o)nists. Not according to intelligent people.
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 23:05:25 GMT
Laboratories have been trying to find a random assembly of life, life from matter not alive, especially since Miller-Urey in the 1950s, and it hasn't happened. Now it can be argued just because life doesn't randomly assemble itself here on Earth doesn't mean it can't assemble itself on another planet. Laboratories also have never managed to create a volcano eruption or an earthquake. Does this mean that volcano eruptions and earthquakes don’t exist? Maybe according to cre(a)ti(o)nists. Not according to intelligent people. The scientists are not connecting the RNA chains, they're trying to observe them connect themselves. Lots of people have observed volcanoes and earthquakes, smart guy.
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Post by phludowin on Feb 18, 2020 23:25:21 GMT
Laboratories also have never managed to create a volcano eruption or an earthquake. Does this mean that volcano eruptions and earthquakes don’t exist? Maybe according to cre(a)ti(o)nists. Not according to intelligent people. The scientists are not connecting the RNA chains, they're trying to observe them connect themselves. Lots of people have observed volcanoes and earthquakes, smart guy. My point was: Just because you can't observe or create something in a laboratory doesn't mean it's not possible under different conditions. The equivalent of people observing abiogenesis when it occurred on Earth would be the equivalent of people observing volcano eruptions or earthquakes from below the crust. This has not been done yet. And for abiogenesis it may never happen, since pressure, temperature and other conditions are different now on Earth than 500 million years ago.
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Post by Arlon10 on Feb 18, 2020 23:28:36 GMT
The scientists are not connecting the RNA chains, they're trying to observe them connect themselves. Lots of people have observed volcanoes and earthquakes, smart guy. My point was: Just because you can't observe or create something in a laboratory doesn't mean it's not possible under different conditions. The equivalent of people observing abiogenesis when it occurred on Earth would be the equivalent of people observing volcano eruptions or earthquakes from below the crust. This has not been done yet. And for abiogenesis it may never happen, since pressure, temperature and other conditions are different now on Earth than 500 million years ago. There are only so may "conditions" possible. If pressure could possibly make any difference (I doubt it would and you should too.) then it has been tried.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 19, 2020 2:01:24 GMT
I agree about philosophy, which is why we need a rigorously defined epistemology (which I find Bayes/Solomonoff to be) and philosophers informed by science. Science may get along well (for the most part) without philosophy--much better than the reverse--but it would still be better off knowing the fundamentals of rationality. I also agree that Bayes isn't a universal path to discovery. It's very much like logic; logic is only as useful as the truth of the propositions we feed it. Likewise, Bayes is only as useful as the accuracy of our priors and the strength of the evidence. However, it's still important to correctly reason and update our beliefs based on new evidence, and the human brain is not innately good at this. In fact, as Aj_June posted HERE, the deviation from Bayes's Theorem in finance can be used to prove the existence of cognitive biases. I doubt if Bayes is taught as any "unifying principle" in science, because the way I'm talking about it is certainly more philosophical in nature. Again, I'd highly recommend reading through that Jaynes textbook as he offers dozens of examples from science, but also from everyday reasoning. Really, I'd say Bayes is more a fundamental principle of rationality; science works because the rationality of science is, essentially, Bayesian even when it isn't explicitly being used, if that makes sense. Einstein didn't like Copenhagen because he understood it would wreck General Relativity--GR is local, real, deterministic; Copenhagen is none of those. If we're being charitable, we might say Einstein deeply felt General Relativity was an accurate model of reality, so he equally felt Copenhagen couldn't be right; if we're being cynical, we might say Einstein was biased because he didn't WANT General Relativity to be wrong. Einstein devised the EPR experiment in an attempt to show what he thought was an absurdity about non-local causality under Copenhagen (basically, the ability of a measurement to affect another measurement at great distances from each other). He thought this proved there must be hidden variables. Unfortunately, Bell's Theorem later showed that no hidden variable theory could account for all the predictions of QM while maintaining locality, so many theorists have just been happy to abandon locality, either in the form of Copenhagen, or in the form of Bohm (which is a hidden variable interpretation). Hugh Everett didn't propose Many-Worlds until 2 years after Einstein's death. Basically, Everett just eliminated the "collapse" of Copenhagen and the "hidden variables" of Bohm and reduced QM to the wavefunction, making QM local, real, and deterministic (like General Relativity). For whatever reason, people don't like it because accepting it would mean that all the other states of the wavefunction, the "worlds," actually exist. I wonder what Einstein would've thought of MW, but it's too late to know now. I do think science depends on a small kernel of philosophy (if done right), to provide a frameworks sort of like the axioms in math and geometry. I think it should be minimized, just as reducing axioms to a bare minimum is an aim in math. I think of it as a bootstrap program used to boot up the full operating system for a computer. The bootstrap is made as small an simple as possible, as, especially in the early days of computing, it had to be entered manually via the computer's front panel. I may have to check out Jayne's book. Do he or she have a good writing style? I think Einstein's resistance to QM and Copenhagen in particular was much more than an insecurity about his theories of relativity. It seems to have been a deep-seated aesthetic disgust at the concept of indeterminacy. Even in his later years, after there were multiple and very solid confirmations of relativity, he remained opposed to Copenhagen, and in fact spent much of his later life trying to unify QM and relativity (unsuccessfully). It would be nice to know Einstein's reaction to MW. To me what is really weird (and really stretches credulity) about MW is that it seems to be a violation of conservation of energy. In ordinary everyday experience, any time we duplicate something, whether in the physical world or in software, extra resources are required to support the increased count of instances (material if physical, computer memory if in software). In a MW scenario (even if all the duplications happen at the beginning), to support the apparent astronomical number of parallel worlds would imply the existence of an astronomical amount of energy. This may be possible but it's quite mind-blowing. Yet if the extent of the observable universe as we understand it today were presented to the ancient Greeks, their minds would have been blown too. So who knows? By the way, interesting discussion! I essentially agree about reducing/minimizing philosophy in science. That's what I like about Bayes; it's simple. I honestly don't believe anything else is needed, philosophy-wise. Hypotheses are priors, experiments/evidence are conditionals, theories are what happens when the experiments/evidence make a hypothesis overwhelmingly likely. For the Jaynes book, I must stress it's meant as a textbook on probability theory, the kind of thing you'd read in college if you were taking a course of probability. When Jaynes is using examples it's perfectly readable, but there are also parts that are quite technical. I found it easy enough to skip over the confusing/technical bits, but still follow along with most of the examples. I don't think it's a book where one must understand every single page to get the substance; understanding every page would only be necessary if one was actually planning on becoming fully educated in probability theory. I think it's mostly interesting to see how he applies the same fundamental reasoning from everything to the most technical examples in science to everyday reasoning about ordinary things. The conservation of energy is a common complaint about MW, but it's unfounded. The reason being that nothing's actually being duplicated. When particles are in a state of superpositioning, that means they're already in multiple places at once. We see this in the double-slit experiment where even firing single particles at a double-slit shows a wave-pattern of single particles interfering with themselves. All of those states--say, a particle being "spin-up" and "spin-down"--are "worlds." When we measure, we (or our measuring devices) are also in multiple states. Our multiple states entangle with the multiple states of the particles, and they decohere from each other into the rest of the environment, essentially separating. Nothing is "duplicated" or "created" in this process; it's just multiple states of multiple systems entangling and decohering. A good overview is from the physicist Sean Carroll: www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/What other interpretations like Copenhagen and Bohm do is that they add stuff to QM to essentially eliminate those other states. Copenhagen adds a stochastic collapse, so that observation causes the other states to go "poof" and disappear. How? Why? Nobody knows. Bohm adds a hidden variable, a kind of "pilot-wave" that "selects" one of the "worlds" so that the other "worlds" are empty. How? Why? Nobody knows. MWI just does away with those additional assumptions. There is, however, a legitimate criticism of MWI, and Sean Carroll addresses this, and it's this: where do the probabilities come from? The Born Rule is where all the predictive power of QM comes from, it tells us probabilities are given by the wavefunction squared. In MWI it's not clear why this is so, while in Shrodinger and Bohm the probabilities are just an innate part of wavefunction. Interesting discussion indeed!
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Post by goz on Feb 19, 2020 2:23:24 GMT
How can you? You speak nonsense as usual. How many years have you here counting the previous boards? Verbs facilitate meaning in sentences.
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Post by goz on Feb 19, 2020 2:29:35 GMT
Please be aware that anyone who uses the term 'common sense' in any kind of statistical, philosophical, rational or scientific argument has already lost at the outset and shows what kind of idiot they are. ...whilst others are even less capable, rely on an admixture of half knowledge, 'common sense', antiquated text books, an overinflated sense of their own knowledge and a belief in an unproven and unlikely god figure that necessarily clouds every judgment. I use the term “common sense” all the time. Am I an idiot? I don't know. If you attribute scientific, philosophical and mathematical/statistical knowledge to 'common sense', then you probably are.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 19, 2020 3:02:09 GMT
What did I claim to be? Dude, I "showed my work" for both problems. I wrote out the entirety of the theorem and what each number was. I don't know how else I'm supposed to "show my work." Your "shown work" was wrong anyway, as P(B|~A) is either .33 or .5, not .66 as you said. How about you explain what you think is "hairy" about your 100-door version. I mean, there's only 4 numbers, and 3 are the same for both versions. In both, P(A) and P(~A) are 50/50. For "50/50" you can use .33/.33, .01/.01, .66/.66... it doesn't matter, they all get the same result. In both, P(B|A) is 1. The only difference is P(B|~A). In both cases, that number is 1/(doors-1). In the 3-door version it's 1/2, in the 100-door version it's 1/99, in a 3748-door version, it's 1/3747. Pretty simple. Yep, Bayes's Theorem is so useless it was used the crack the Enigma Code and hunt down Russian Submarines in the Cold War... not to mention it's the backbone of most modern AIs and stuff like spam filtering. Yep, totally useless. When we eventually invent AIs running Solomonoff Induction/Bayes's Theorem solving all kinds of problems for us, it'll be useless then too. This is not my job. It is not my hobby. I do not believe it has real value. Obviously you spend far more time on it than I do. I suspect because you think it has more value than it does, or you gamble too much. The defenders of Bayes' Theorem that agreed with your overrating of it are gone. That is except "gadreel" whom I have long suspected is your sock. AJ has to study it for his goals in school, but I think he realizes that real life does not employ the theorem very often. The taxicab problem is not real and it shows terribly. If taxicab companies are really different and they use the same makes and models of vehicles and you can't tell one from another they would add markings or equipment of some kind so that you can tell. That's just common sense. A statistical assessment adequate to be meaningful of only one person's color detection is going to be beyond the time, expense and usefulness for any court's resources. It would probably show a binary condition anyway, can or can't distinguish the colors. The taxicab problem is for people with no common sense. Again you do not show your work when you list the theorem's "historic" accomplishments. I gamble for a living, so it's quite valuable to me, and, again, it was quite valuable in two wars. I have no socks. Admin has my permission to look at my IP and tell you if I have any socks. The taxi cab problem shows how people under/overestimate priors and/or new evidence. Its purpose is to show the existence of cognitive biases that deviate from rationality. Kahneman has dozens of examples of this in his books on cognitive bias. How would I "show my work" when listing the theorem's historic accomplishments? Do you know nothing about how the Enigma code was cracked? You can read about them HERE, but there's nothing I can do to overcome your desire not to believe facts and science you dislike. Here are several links that discuss Bayes and The Enigma Code (the first discusses many more applications): theconversation.com/bayes-theorem-the-maths-tool-we-probably-use-every-day-but-what-is-it-76140 www.intelligentinvestor.com.au/investment-news/the-theory-that-cracked-the-enigma-code/138342www.singingbanana.com/enigmaproject/maths.pdfYou can treat any series of events as a single event probabilistically. Just multiply the probabilities of each event happening together. However, this is not necessary in the 100-door problem, because asking the probability of any door being left shut (1/99) gives us the same probability of opening any sequence of 98 doors. If you were asking about any particular sequence's probability (say, he opens 77, then 43, then 2, then 87, etc.) that would be a different matter, but we don't care about the particular sequence of opening. It seems you slipped from talking about the 99-door variation to the 3-door variation. I also don't know why you're making "not opening door 3" "Event B." First off, the "event" is the opening of door 2, not the "not opening" of door 3. I mean, I guess they're technically equivalent, but I have no idea why you'd prefer to write that as a double negative... and you complain about my English? Second, there is no "Event A." "A" is a prior, not an event. Finally, the only reason your solution works in this case is because the priors happen to be 50/50. If the priors were anything else, your "P=1 behind D3, subtract 1/3" wouldn't work." The reason it's actually .66 is because the priors for both D3 and D1 are 50/50. When you multiple D3 by 1 (as you did), and multiple D1 by .5 (which you didn't), you end up with 50/25, and because 50 is twice 25, it's .67/.33. Amazing how everyone solving Monty Hall using Bayes is not giving a "proper solution" and only you are. I guess when the Professor at the Department of Statistics at the University of Toronto is also solving Monty Hall using Bayes, he still doesn't know what he's talking about. What would a professor of Statistics at a major University know about probability? I think I'm going to concoct my own little problem that you can't solve using your "proper solution." We'll see how well you do.
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Post by Admin on Feb 19, 2020 3:15:45 GMT
I have no socks. Admin has my permission to look at my IP and tell you if I have any socks. You're being accused of having socks? Good lord, no one is safe... I knew it before I looked: Your IP doesn't match any other account here, so if you have any socks, I'm not aware of them. Case dismissed.
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