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Post by Isapop on Nov 30, 2020 18:31:20 GMT
I've come to the belief that one reason we talk is that I don't get into ways about he should handle his business. That's just not what we talk about. But surely everything by definition is 'His business', while how He handles it is the ultimate preoccupation of faith religion and scripture? Maybe, I don't know. But like I said, that's not what we talk about.
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Post by goz on Nov 30, 2020 21:16:52 GMT
DO TELL! Was it written or spoken, What was his accent like? No accent. He just speaks better than me. So that means by inference since you are an American, that God speaks American English? DUH! Why didnt I already know that?
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Post by goz on Nov 30, 2020 21:19:50 GMT
But surely everything by definition is 'His business', while how He handles it is the ultimate preoccupation of faith religion and scripture? Maybe, I don't know. But like I said, that's not what we talk about. Is it guy stuff because he is a bloke?
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Post by Isapop on Nov 30, 2020 21:56:49 GMT
Maybe, I don't know. But like I said, that's not what we talk about. Is it guy stuff because he is a bloke? No. Movies, mostly.
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Post by goz on Nov 30, 2020 22:25:55 GMT
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Post by The Lost One on Nov 30, 2020 23:28:02 GMT
I think you misunderstand Hume's point which is that the evidence for miracles happening at all is outweighed by the evidence for the laws of nature. Hume's argument always bothers me. A miracle is supposedly a supernatural occurence outside the laws of nature, not a natural refutation of them. The believer in miracles doesn't doubt the laws of nature exist so the strength of their evidence isn't really relevant. To put it another way, if our evidence for a supposed natural law (eg the dead do not come back to life) was actually very weak, then the dead coming back to life wouldn't seem a miracle. The stronger our evidence for natural laws, the more miraculous is any supposed exception to them. That's not to say the conclusion is we ought to believe in miracles, just Hume's argument that we ought not doesn't seem to hold water. Edit: ah I see Archelaus already made this point much more succinctly than my attempt! |
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Post by rachelcarson1953 on Dec 1, 2020 0:51:37 GMT
...some religious preachers claim that God came down and talked to them? If a homeless person went on TV and claimed the voices in his head said they were God everyone would think the homeless person was either on drugs or suffering from a mental illness. Yet if a wanabe preacher says it, people think it's Gospel? Not only do they think it's Gospel, but people then throw money at the wannabe preacher. The preacher(s) have a better patter and delivery system. Maybe it's because they wear a suit and tie. "Writing for a penny a word is ridiculous. If a man really wanted to make a million dollars, he'd start his own religion." – L. Ron Hubbard I just love that quote from L. Ron Hubbard. Amazing that intelligent people fall for his made-up cult, still to this day.
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Post by FilmFlaneur on Dec 1, 2020 21:36:13 GMT
I think you misunderstand Hume's point which is that the evidence for miracles happening at all is outweighed by the evidence for the laws of nature. Hume's argument always bothers me. A miracle is supposedly a supernatural occurence outside the laws of nature, not a natural refutation of them. The believer in miracles doesn't doubt the laws of nature exist so the strength of their evidence isn't really relevant. I think the issue would be the readiness of the believer to accept that the laws of nature can be broken. The refutation would be in their notion that the laws do not always apply, everywhere, and at all times, in ways that do not admit the interference from another less predictable or logical reality. That consistency can be argued a law of itself.
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Post by The Lost One on Dec 1, 2020 21:46:47 GMT
I think the issue would be the readiness of the believer to accept that the laws of nature can be broken. The refutation would be in their notion that the laws do not always apply, everywhere, and at all times, in ways that do not admit the interference from another less predictable or logical reality. That consistency can be argued a law of itself. Isn't that question begging though? If Hume assumes there is no supernatural that can override the natural, well then miracles cannot happen anyway. |
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Post by FilmFlaneur on Dec 1, 2020 21:56:28 GMT
I think the issue would be the readiness of the believer to accept that the laws of nature can be broken. The refutation would be in their notion that the laws do not always apply, everywhere, and at all times, in ways that do not admit the interference from another less predictable or logical reality. That consistency can be argued a law of itself. Isn't that question begging though? If Hume assumes there is no supernatural that can override the natural, well then miracles cannot happen anyway. Well to be fair (for legal and social reasons one presumes) Hume was careful never to declare God does not exist per se, although his writings were seen as atheistic.
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Post by The Lost One on Dec 1, 2020 22:14:57 GMT
Well to be fair (for legal and social reasons one presumes) Hume was careful never to declare God does not exist per se, although his writings were seen as atheistic. Perhaps his argument against miracles was a roundabout way of saying the supernatural doesn't exist without actually saying it. But taken on its own merit, I think the argument is flawed. |
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Post by FilmFlaneur on Dec 1, 2020 22:18:36 GMT
Well to be fair (for legal and social reasons one presumes) Hume was careful never to declare God does not exist per se, although his writings were seen as atheistic. Perhaps his argument against miracles was a roundabout way of saying the supernatural doesn't exist without actually saying it. But taken on its own merit, I think the argument is flawed. Well, although I respect your view, I can't agree. It seems perfectly reasonable to compare the evidence for two proposals about reality and go for the option as most likely which has the most (or any). It is after all something we all do all the time.
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Post by The Lost One on Dec 1, 2020 22:40:47 GMT
. It seems perfectly reasonable to compare the evidence for two proposals about reality and go for the option as most likely which has the most (or any). It is after all something we all do all the time. But the two proposals rely on the same evidence. The believer uses the strength of the evidence for natural laws to say that any exception to them would be a miracle. The sceptic uses the strength of the evidence for natural laws to argue they cannot be overruled. Both rely on the same evidence for their conclusion. The difference between them is a presumption about whether there is something that can overrule natural laws or not and Hume doesn't address this presumption in his argument. One can imagine a conversation like this: Martha: Jesus brought Lazarus back from the dead! It's a miracle! Mary: Don't be silly, people don't rise from the dead. Martha: I know, that's what makes it a miracle! |
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Post by FilmFlaneur on Dec 1, 2020 22:52:15 GMT
. It seems perfectly reasonable to compare the evidence for two proposals about reality and go for the option as most likely which has the most (or any). It is after all something we all do all the time. But the two proposals rely on the same evidence. The believer uses the strength of the evidence for natural laws to say that any exception to them would be a miracle. The sceptic uses the strength of the evidence for natural laws to argue they cannot be overruled. Both rely on the same evidence for their conclusion. The difference between them is a presumption about whether there is something that can overrule natural laws or not and Hume doesn't address this presumption in his argument. One can imagine a conversation like this: Martha: Jesus brought Lazarus back from the dead! It's a miracle! Mary: Don't be silly, people don't rise from the dead. Martha: I know, that's what makes it a miracle! A better known example of this form of special pleading for a proposed alternate scheme of things, one that is impervious to different levels of corroboration is that of Sagan's Dragon. A miraculous beast, the existence of which is qualified at every turn because it turns out 'it's special' in every particular, since, well, that's what makes it miraculous isn't it? :- It would indeed be a miracle if a dragon existed in Sagan's garage. But then if it is so, so, special and if we accept that presumption, we ultimately end up with endless credulity, where nothing is impossible, as we can make endless exceptions to the rules for everything we can imagine.
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Post by The Lost One on Dec 1, 2020 23:29:34 GMT
But then if it is so, so, special and if we accept that presumption, we ultimately end up with endless credulity, where nothing is impossible, as we can make endless exceptions to the rules for everything we can imagine, by offering exceptionalism as the only reason required that things might exist. Sure, but isn't that what a miracle is? If a miracle is defined as an exceptional supernatural event that overrides natural laws (a definition that I imagine Hume would readily accept) then Hume's argument boils down to "we shouldn't believe in reports of exceptional events because we ought only to believe in the unexceptional" - it still seems like question begging to me. Now, you could develop the point and give reasons why we shouldn't believe that exceptions can happen, but Hume doesn't do that. Some discussion on this point here: iep.utm.edu/miracles/#SH5a |
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Post by FilmFlaneur on Dec 1, 2020 23:37:40 GMT
But then if it is so, so, special and if we accept that presumption, we ultimately end up with endless credulity, where nothing is impossible, as we can make endless exceptions to the rules for everything we can imagine, by offering exceptionalism as the only reason required that things might exist. Sure, but isn't that what a miracle is? If a miracle is defined as an exceptional supernatural event that overrides natural laws (a definition that I imagine Hume would readily accept) then Hume's argument boils down to "we shouldn't believe in reports of exceptional events because we ought only to believe in the unexceptional" - it still seems like question begging to me. Now, you could develop the point and give reasons why we shouldn't believe that exceptions can happen, but Hume doesn't do that. I think without evidence, the burden of proof is not mine here. (Not to mention the fact that because a super exceptional event is even possible, that does not mean it is likely). The question is more why we should believe , when the only reason is that might be is they are qualified into existence. Otherwise we can easily, like Carroll's Queen, end up believing six impossible things (or impossible things qualified into possibility) before breakfast. To extend your question, btw, is to ask why on this basis should we not believe absolutely everything we can quickly qualify as a 'special' case, since with all bets off, there is no distinction within that class of thing between 'good' and 'bad' special?
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Post by The Lost One on Dec 2, 2020 0:03:13 GMT
I think without evidence, the burden of proof is not mine here. Perhaps not, but here you are going beyond Hume. I am not saying we ought to believe in reports of miracles, only that Hume's particular reason why we shouldn't isn't very good. Indeed, why shouldn't we? I can think of several possible reasons but Hume doesn't present any of them. Hume does actually make supplementary arguments to his main argument about miracles but they're not terribly good either. |
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Post by FilmFlaneur on Dec 2, 2020 22:39:53 GMT
I think without evidence, the burden of proof is not mine here. Perhaps not, but here you are going beyond Hume. I am not saying we ought to believe in reports of miracles, only that Hume's particular reason why we shouldn't isn't very good. Well, it looks like we will have to agree to disagree. I can't see it being unreasonable to believe first in those things which are evidenced, while to compare those in likelihood to things that aren't is common strategy in life. The absence of such evidence might, yes, mean that we need not dismiss any other things out of hand, but at the same time the only reason to accept they might is through increasingly qualifying assumptions, beginning with the assumption that miracles exist, ultimately made without any quality control of thought. To say that something might happen, even though absolutely extraordinary and unnatural, 'because it would be a miracle' ought not to close off any rational questioning but instead be the start of it.
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Post by The Lost One on Dec 3, 2020 9:19:56 GMT
I can't see it being unreasonable to believe first in those things which are evidenced But again, that's not what's happening here. It's not "laws of nature" vs "miracles", it's "laws of nature + miracles" vs "laws of nature only". Therefore evidence for the laws of nature cannot settle the argument in the way Hume suggests. I don't have huge problems with your argument here - but it is not Hume's argument. |
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Post by Arlon10 on Dec 3, 2020 11:59:59 GMT
I can't see it being unreasonable to believe first in those things which are evidenced But again, that's not what's happening here. It's not "laws of nature" vs "miracles", it's "laws of nature + miracles" vs "laws of nature only". Therefore evidence for the laws of nature cannot settle the argument in the way Hume suggests. I don't have huge problems with your argument here - but it is not Hume's argument. I agree that Hume's argument is not much service. He and FilmFlaneur appear to be enforcing a simplistic worldview. My perspective on "miracles" is that they are only miracles to those who cannot perform them or have any inkling how they are performed. To a god none of its actions would seem miraculous assuming that god understood what it is doing. When people who live far outside civilization first see airplanes they might consider them miraculous. (I think I read somewhere that happened.) Now my opponents here might jump in and say by that reasoning the origin of life must be explained without any god, which obviously is not true. That would be assuming humans must have all capacities. There is no good reason for such an assumption. Even if it were true that humans can obtain all capacities, that might mean a total reevaluation of what is "natural."
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