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Post by goz on Feb 19, 2018 2:26:22 GMT
Your analogy is not relevant because the options are only variants and not absolute truths. Objective moralists cannot disagree if there is only one objective truth. The fact you disagree is the whole point. Ok I give up. Let us agree to disagree.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 19, 2018 3:31:47 GMT
First, it's nice to see you back on the board Kiera! Thanks though not sure I'll be back for any length of time. I don't think this applies. If Bigfoot existed you might expect to find evidence of him. But what evidence of goodness could you expect if such a thing existed? You could of course take a logical positivist stance and say anything that would not produce evidence should not be part of our ontology but that doesn't strike me as the stance Goz is taking - if she were then the disagreement about moral viewpoints is irrelevant to this argument. Conditional oughts can be objective eg if I want to win the race I ought to run fast. So if there were a hypothetical ontological goodness (putting aside what that might be for the time being) one could say if you wish to be good, you ought to do X. Wishing to be good, would still be up to the subject but good actions themselves would not be. At any rate, again this seems a very different argument from Goz's which is that diversity in moral opinion implies there are no moral facts. It's this I was taking exception to, not the denial of moral facts per se. 1. I wasn't taking up goz's argument(s), just presenting my own. I think I kinda asked that same question (what evidence of goodness could you expect...) in my second argument. To me, if you can't even conceive of what the evidence for something would look like, then I don't know how you can even imagine it being objective. 2. The "conditional" ought requires a subjective desire: in your example it's "I WANT to win the race." Without the "want" part, you have no "ought" to run fast. Sure, IF there's an ontological goodness then what's good isn't up to the subject; but my entire point with my second argument is that I don't see how it's even really possible to seriously imagine such a thing. One can imagine states of the world, and one can imagine thinking that certain states are "good" or "better than others," but I don't know how one can imagine any being good/better independent of one thinking about it. I think Shakespeare via Hamlet got it right 4 centuries ago: "Nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so."
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Post by phludowin on Feb 19, 2018 7:24:28 GMT
Ok I think the issue here is for you objective morality means adhering to a list of rigid rules and that's not quite correct. It means that there is such an objective thing as goodness and what is moral is what adheres to this goodness. So the least harm approach would assume that what is good is what causes least harm (incidentally the least harm stance is not my stance). Others may disagree on what actions and maxims adhere to goodness but they agree that there is such a thing as goodness. So some Christians think to be good we must never kill while others think we may kill in some circumstances. But they agree that there is a right answer even if at least one of them has it wrong. So that's the difference between objectivists and subjectivists - one side thinks there is a right answer when we ask what is moral and the other does not. That objectivists may differ on what they think the right answer is but that's neither here nor there. So objective morality would depend on objective truth and objective goodness existing. What is objectively true? What is objectively good? Humans have subjective experience; therefore they will never know the answer to these question. Therefore, as far as humans are concerned, objective truth or goodness might as well not exist. Conclusion: Looking for objective morality in that sense is futile in my opinion.
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The Lost One
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Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 7:49:03 GMT
Ok I think the issue here is for you objective morality means adhering to a list of rigid rules and that's not quite correct. It means that there is such an objective thing as goodness and what is moral is what adheres to this goodness. So the least harm approach would assume that what is good is what causes least harm (incidentally the least harm stance is not my stance). Others may disagree on what actions and maxims adhere to goodness but they agree that there is such a thing as goodness. So some Christians think to be good we must never kill while others think we may kill in some circumstances. But they agree that there is a right answer even if at least one of them has it wrong. So that's the difference between objectivists and subjectivists - one side thinks there is a right answer when we ask what is moral and the other does not. That objectivists may differ on what they think the right answer is but that's neither here nor there. So objective morality would depend on objective truth and objective goodness existing. What is objectively true? What is objectively good? Humans have subjective experience; therefore they will never know the answer to these question. Therefore, as far as humans are concerned, objective truth or goodness might as well not exist. Conclusion: Looking for objective morality in that sense is futile in my opinion. I don't disagree as such. My stance is not that these things are discoverable.
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The Lost One
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Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 8:02:36 GMT
Thanks though not sure I'll be back for any length of time. I don't think this applies. If Bigfoot existed you might expect to find evidence of him. But what evidence of goodness could you expect if such a thing existed? You could of course take a logical positivist stance and say anything that would not produce evidence should not be part of our ontology but that doesn't strike me as the stance Goz is taking - if she were then the disagreement about moral viewpoints is irrelevant to this argument. Conditional oughts can be objective eg if I want to win the race I ought to run fast. So if there were a hypothetical ontological goodness (putting aside what that might be for the time being) one could say if you wish to be good, you ought to do X. Wishing to be good, would still be up to the subject but good actions themselves would not be. At any rate, again this seems a very different argument from Goz's which is that diversity in moral opinion implies there are no moral facts. It's this I was taking exception to, not the denial of moral facts per se. 1. I wasn't taking up goz's argument(s), just presenting my own. I think I kinda asked that same question (what evidence of goodness could you expect...) in my second argument. To me, if you can't even conceive of what the evidence for something would look like, then I don't know how you can even imagine it being objective. 2. The "conditional" ought requires a subjective desire: in your example it's "I WANT to win the race." Without the "want" part, you have no "ought" to run fast. Sure, IF there's an ontological goodness then what's good isn't up to the subject; but my entire point with my second argument is that I don't see how it's even really possible to seriously imagine such a thing. One can imagine states of the world, and one can imagine thinking that certain states are "good" or "better than others," but I don't know how one can imagine any being good/better independent of one thinking about it. I think Shakespeare via Hamlet got it right 4 centuries ago: "Nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so." People though have often imagined that there is an independent right thing to do. I don't think they need to be able to qualify what manner of thing that might be ontologically speaking. I wouldn't necessarily say Shakespeare was wrong but it seems to me if we take his stance ethics becomes a nonsense. How can we even have a moral dilemma if all our potential actions are equally valid? We may as well do what seems most advantageous to ourselves and those we care about in every instance. That's fine so far as it goes but is that really ethics any more? And can people stop thinking ethically?
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Post by CoolJGS☺ on Feb 19, 2018 12:02:12 GMT
I didn't quote you. However, you are still conflating some things which makes. So while your statement correct to some extent, the blaming of religions not getting it incorrect and I can only assume you will say that there's a million interpretations for that even though there's not. Further, it may be that you chose a universal moral code that isn't actually one while something like infanticide is a more accurate universal moral code. EXCUSE ME! Because you didn't quote me, does that mean I am unable to answer you, when we are involved in the same discussion ? I hope you are editing this as it in not making sense. So universalists can claim that an objective moral code applies to killing infants butt not killing children or adults? Is it Miller time? 1. You can quote me anytime, but if I don;t quote you, my statement may not be specifically about your comment. 2. Well, I'm talking about killing your own kid, but I don;t know the term for that and didn't feel like looking it up. Killing your own kid or family is more of a universal moral no-no than simply the act of killing.
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Post by phludowin on Feb 19, 2018 13:12:21 GMT
Killing your own kid or family is more of a universal moral no-no than simply the act of killing. No it's not.
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Post by CoolJGS☺ on Feb 19, 2018 13:18:53 GMT
Killing your own kid or family is more of a universal moral no-no than simply the act of killing. No it's not. That's probably true once abortions are factored into it, but I didn't want to get political...
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Post by phludowin on Feb 19, 2018 13:23:47 GMT
That's probably true once abortions are factored into it, but I didn't want to get political... It's also true without considering abortions. Not killing your offspring is not a universal moral standard.
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Post by CoolJGS☺ on Feb 19, 2018 13:25:52 GMT
That's probably true once abortions are factored into it, but I didn't want to get political... It's also true without considering abortions. Not killing your offspring is not a universal moral standard. Ok, that's why I said it would be more of one than simply killing someone. if you are saying they are the equivalent i would disagree, but if we are only discussing what makes a moral code, the it doesn't matter. I am perfectly ok with accepting there is no universal code.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 19, 2018 13:38:27 GMT
1. I wasn't taking up goz's argument(s), just presenting my own. I think I kinda asked that same question (what evidence of goodness could you expect...) in my second argument. To me, if you can't even conceive of what the evidence for something would look like, then I don't know how you can even imagine it being objective. 2. The "conditional" ought requires a subjective desire: in your example it's "I WANT to win the race." Without the "want" part, you have no "ought" to run fast. Sure, IF there's an ontological goodness then what's good isn't up to the subject; but my entire point with my second argument is that I don't see how it's even really possible to seriously imagine such a thing. One can imagine states of the world, and one can imagine thinking that certain states are "good" or "better than others," but I don't know how one can imagine any being good/better independent of one thinking about it. I think Shakespeare via Hamlet got it right 4 centuries ago: "Nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so." People though have often imagined that there is an independent right thing to do. I don't think they need to be able to qualify what manner of thing that might be ontologically speaking. I wouldn't necessarily say Shakespeare was wrong but it seems to me if we take his stance ethics becomes a nonsense. How can we even have a moral dilemma if all our potential actions are equally valid? We may as well do what seems most advantageous to ourselves and those we care about in every instance. That's fine so far as it goes but is that really ethics any more? And can people stop thinking ethically? I should've phrased that better; because of the mind projection fallacy and because people, in general, DON'T really think about the subjective/objective distinction, what evidence is, and what evidence it would take in order to make anything objective, I understand why the subjective gets imagined as being objective. However, if one is thinking about the subjective/objective distinction correctly/clearly, and understand that what's considered objective are statements about how the world is and what's subjective are statements about how we feel about things, and how the world is is relayed mostly be sensory evidence and how we reason from that evidence; and, given all that, if you can't imagine what any evidence would look like in order to make some concept objective, THEN I don't know how you would imagine it being objective (that was a mouthful! lol). It's kinda like saying "I don't see how anyone who's rational and aware of all the evidence for evolution can reject evolution." All our potential actions aren't "equally valid" either in relation to ourselves or to others, and that's the entire point of ethics. It's kinda like asking, "since any rules we invent for a game are as valid as any other, why invent rules at all?" Well, we need the rules to play the game, just like we need ethics to function in and as a society. Luckily, humans are enough alike that the vast majority of us share a lot of basic values that makes this possible, even if there are always controversial and contentious subjects. Just doing what's advantageous to ourselves isn't really ethics since ethics is interpersonal, not solely determined by us and what we want. It's a group effort in order to make the group function better. Everybody on their own is anarchy. You don't see moral behavior in asocial animals, but you see it consistently among social ones.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 19, 2018 14:15:41 GMT
If it were ever the case that there was some universal moral stance--for example, imagine that at some historical point, every single person alive agrees with "It is unequivocally, morally wrong to kill one's family members," that would simply be a contingent fact about that historical point. It wouldn't be any more significant than if we had 1000 coins that we kept flipping and on one iteration they all came up heads. Not that that wouldn't be worth noting, but there's no broader implication to it. And not to suggest that morality works randomly--it's more complicated than that, but it would just be a contingent historical fact, one that could and likely would easily change at another historical point.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 19, 2018 14:55:54 GMT
How can we even have a moral dilemma if all our potential actions are equally valid? I don't know what Shakespeare quote we're talking about, but "all of our potential actions are equally valid" to whom? It sounds like you're referencing the objectivist misunderstanding of what subjectivists are saying/of the upshots of subjectivism. The problem is this: Objectivists defer to objectivity, and they assume that that's what one should be doing when it comes to morality. One should be against murder because it's objectively wrong to murder (whatever "objectively wrong to murder" is amounting to, exactly--we can ignore that part). So when subjectivists give their picture of what's going on, objectivists think, "Well, that means that every moral stance is 'equally valid'," because, in their view, we should be deferring to objectivity, and objectively, on the subjectivist picture, every moral stance is equally valid. But that's not what the subjectivist view is. Subjectivists don't think that we should be deferring to objectivity at all when it comes to morality, because the objective realm is the wrong realm to be talking about. On the subjectivist view, deferring to objectivity when you're talking about morality is like worrying about the weather in Australia when you're headed to Las Vegas--you're looking in the wrong location. And subjectively, it's not at all the case that all stances are equally valid. So we have moral dilemmas because people have moral views, where sometimes those views conflict with other views those people hold, sometimes they conflict with other people they have to interact with because they live in the same society, and so on.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Feb 19, 2018 14:57:04 GMT
How can we even have a moral dilemma if all our potential actions are equally valid? I don't know what Shakespeare quote we're talking about... I quoted Hamlet's "nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so."
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Post by CoolJGS☺ on Feb 19, 2018 15:12:41 GMT
The thing about universal moral codes is it would barely be considered a moral in the first place. It would be borderline instinctual make it pert near irrelevant even if it existed.
The reason why several moral codes exists at once is because there are different authorities demanding different things and those are always going to be more important than the universal one with one of them likely being top dog.
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The Lost One
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Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 15:56:50 GMT
Just doing what's advantageous to ourselves isn't really ethics since ethics is interpersonal, not solely determined by us and what we want. It's a group effort in order to make the group function better. But why should we care about the functioning of the group? Sure it's often (but not always) in our best interest to do so, but that is just a return to "We may as well do what seems most advantageous to ourselves and those we care about in every instance" whilst adding "and it is generally in your best interests to go with what helps the group function." But what about where we see it is to our advantage to not help the group? Is it immoral to take that advantage?
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 19, 2018 16:56:29 GMT
Just doing what's advantageous to ourselves isn't really ethics since ethics is interpersonal, not solely determined by us and what we want. It's a group effort in order to make the group function better. But why should we care about the functioning of the group? Sure it's often (but not always) in our best interest to do so, but that is just a return to "We may as well do what seems most advantageous to ourselves and those we care about in every instance" whilst adding "and it is generally in your best interests to go with what helps the group function." But what about where we see it is to our advantage to not help the group? Is it immoral to take that advantage? It's not a matter of why people should care about the group. It's simply that people do care about the group, care about others. It's an intuitive way that many people feel. If you want to get into why that is, surely it has deep evolutionary reasons. A lot of creatures, including lots of our evolutionary ancestors, survive better in (social) groups.
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The Lost One
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Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 17:05:08 GMT
But why should we care about the functioning of the group? Sure it's often (but not always) in our best interest to do so, but that is just a return to "We may as well do what seems most advantageous to ourselves and those we care about in every instance" whilst adding "and it is generally in your best interests to go with what helps the group function." But what about where we see it is to our advantage to not help the group? Is it immoral to take that advantage? It's not a matter of why people should care about the group. It's simply that people do care about the group, care about others. It's an intuitive way that many people feel. If you want to get into why that is, surely it has deep evolutionary reasons. A lot of creatures, including lots of our evolutionary ancestors, survive better in (social) groups. Ok, but what if I am a psychopath who does not care about the group? Or I only care about sub-groups within the group? Is it immoral to ignore the wider group in those instances?
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Post by Terrapin Station on Feb 19, 2018 18:16:38 GMT
It's not a matter of why people should care about the group. It's simply that people do care about the group, care about others. It's an intuitive way that many people feel. If you want to get into why that is, surely it has deep evolutionary reasons. A lot of creatures, including lots of our evolutionary ancestors, survive better in (social) groups. Ok, but what if I am a psychopath who does not care about the group? Or I only care about sub-groups within the group? Is it immoral to ignore the wider group in those instances? Is it immoral to whom? That's the question you always have to ask when trying to understand the subjectivist explanation of morality. Things are always moral or immoral to someone. You have to think about it the same sort of terms that you'd think about something that almost everyone believes is an individual mental phenomenon. Dreaming, for example. It doesn't make much sense to ask "Was there a dream that someone was dressed like Batman and jumped into a pool full of marshmallows," unless we're asking it of a particular person. Dreams don't occur in some disembodied way, "in general." They're mental phenomena that individuals experience. Likewise with moral stances. So when we ask "Is it immoral," we're asking whether some particular person feels that it's immoral. Some people will. Others will not. That doesn't imply that people do not feel that it's either moral or immoral. It's just like obviously no one is saying that people do not dream. We simply need to place the phenomena in the correct location.
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The Lost One
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Post by The Lost One on Feb 19, 2018 19:24:20 GMT
Ok, but what if I am a psychopath who does not care about the group? Or I only care about sub-groups within the group? Is it immoral to ignore the wider group in those instances? Is it immoral to whom? That's the question you always have to ask when trying to understand the subjectivist explanation of morality. Things are always moral or immoral to someone. You have to think about it the same sort of terms that you'd think about something that almost everyone believes is an individual mental phenomenon. Dreaming, for example. It doesn't make much sense to ask "Was there a dream that someone was dressed like Batman and jumped into a pool full of marshmallows," unless we're asking it of a particular person. Dreams don't occur in some disembodied way, "in general." They're mental phenomena that individuals experience. Likewise with moral stances. So when we ask "Is it immoral," we're asking whether some particular person feels that it's immoral. Some people will. Others will not. That doesn't imply that people do not feel that it's either moral or immoral. It's just like obviously no one is saying that people do not dream. We simply need to place the phenomena in the correct location. Ok that makes sense. But is there then any difference between saying "I think X is immoral" and "I don't like X"?
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