fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 18:20:56 GMT
I take by "really imaginable" you mean "behaviorally, functionally, or physically--" but that's pretty much achieved in the thought experiment itself since they're defined as being "behaviorally... etc." identical to us with the exception of not experiencing consciousness. I don't know how a p-zombie would be different behaviourally, physically, or functionally, so maybe you could describe it to me. And ontologically negating consciousness begs the p-zombie's own question of consciousness' ontology. Please see my last reply to cupcakes, prior to this reply.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 18:25:58 GMT
Right. So then you see it as only about language, relative to specific definitions? Yes. I said as much in this post: imdb2.freeforums.net/post/241360/threadBut beyond that, it's clear that some things can only be possible/impossible because of definitions while some things--the composition of water, what is or causes consciousness--are not just about definitions but also a posteriori evidence, typically empirical. So would you say, for example, that married bachelors are logically possible just in case we define "bachelor" as "male who is amenable to being married, but who isn't necessarily married at present"?
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 13, 2017 18:36:14 GMT
tpfkar Sure, and in this rendering it is self-contradictory, because if there is a physical difference, and we can view all of the physical, then we in fact would be able to distinguish. If they existed (in the rendering above), then they'd imply that "consciousness" is not of the brain. But assuming consciousness is of the brain (along with the knowledge stipulations above), then they are logically impossible. "Creative indulgence" could be used to characterize a whole whole lot of things. Everything Harry tells you is a lie
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 18:51:31 GMT
tpfkar Sure, and in this rendering it is self-contradictory, because if there is a physical difference, and we can view all of the physical, then we in fact would be able to distinguish. How would a p-zombie be physically different? show me the part that we call mind and tell me where to cut it from the part we call body to produce a p-zombie. If there was a unicorn and I asked you to cut a part away to make it look like a pony, regardless of whether you would, would you know what part to cut off in order to resemble a pony? I'll state it simply then as: what does a p-zombie such as you advocate tell us about the mind-body problem?
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 13, 2017 19:05:10 GMT
tpfkar If we could examine all of the physical, and there is a physical difference, we'd be able to specify what's in one and not the other. In the case of the unicorn/horse, once you list the physical properties or just properties of the unicorn and those of the horse, then your parts would be the list of nonintersecting properties. I don't "advocate" p-zombies. In fact I specified quite explicitly that in my view they have no effect on physicalism/materialism in any sense. nowhere, shampoo, tv, combat
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 19:20:47 GMT
tpfkar If we could examine all of the physical, and there is a physical difference, we'd be able to specify what's in one and not the other. In the case of the unicorn/horse, once you list the physical properties or just properties of the unicorn and those of the horse, then your parts would be the list of nonintersecting properties. And If we could then no need to posit p-zombies in the first place because we'd know that they were logically possible. Why do you think p-zombies were posited? Okay bad choice of word, why do you say p-zombies are logically possible?
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 13, 2017 19:37:38 GMT
tpfkar It's not about actually could, it's about conceptually, in the thought experiment. Short of that the physical difference could easily be impossible to distinguish, but then would yield no conclusion regarding materialism. And if everybody agreed with me on everything they'd never need to posit anything at all that contradicted my thinking. In the formulation where perfect physical detail is available, the difference between possessing a consciousness and not would, as a physical property, be discernible. Saying p-zombies exist in this case would just be asserting that consciousness is not of the physical. In the formulation without complete physical visibility, they're eminently possible but ineffective as an argument against materialism. nobody laughs anymore
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 19:52:00 GMT
I'm not quite getting the gist of the discussion between cupcakes and fatpaul.
The standard p-zombie argument is simply that p-zombies are conceivable, hence physicalism is undermined.
Under the standard p-zombie argument, we're positing a world that is physically identical to our world. It doesn't matter whether we can observe every physical detail in the world or not.
The p-zombie argument asserts that physically identical humans who happen to not be conscious are conceivable, and it concludes that because of this, it is a metaphysical (not just logical) possibility. And then it concludes from that that physicalism is false.
I'm not saying I agree with the p-zombie argument--obviously I do not, as I commented earlier. I don't think the argument works at all, in multiple regards. But the above is what the p-zombie argument is.
Are you guys talking about some other variation on it or something?
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 20:02:07 GMT
It's not about actually could, it's about conceptually, in the thought experiment. If it is not about actual ontology then it not the traditionally argued philosophical p-zombie I was talking of which does question actual ontology so no interest to me. Thought experiments are conceptual in nature as in thinking tools that may help us arrive at was is intrinsically real, what is actual. The issue of possibility is not an issue of a possible description of mind-body separation. The possibility is in the truth of the statement and a statement needs to be first semantically valid in order for it to be sound and worthy of a possible truth. If you say here's fuzzy A without fuzzy B or here's A with a fuzzy part of A separate then what the fuzzy hell is going on here!
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 20:08:15 GMT
The p-zombie argument asserts that physically identical humans who happen to not be conscious are conceivable, and it concludes that because of this, it is a metaphysical (not just logical) possibility. And then it concludes from that that physicalism is false. Yeah I'm basically saying this in that a logical possible p-zombie implies not a necessary physical monism.
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 13, 2017 20:12:33 GMT
tpfkar They help us think about them, that's for sure. I'm not sure what you were or weren't talking of specifically pereviously, I just posted my thoughts on p-zombies in which I saw "indistinguishable" as a critical but (to me) ambiguous wedge. Amen, brother. I want certainty
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Post by cupcakes on Apr 13, 2017 20:19:00 GMT
tpfkar Which would be a massive non-sequitur, and as far I can tell, dead on arrival. I can conceive that our consciousnesses were implanted in us by a witch and exist in black magic and not in the brain, or in an electronics-filled trailer thousands of miles distant, but that doesn't yield any conclusions on physicalism or anything else. It does if you wish to break it down to try to get some sense out of it. And you don't have to follow some cookbook of directions when discussing these things. At least I don't. big screen dolls, tits and explosions
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 20:24:28 GMT
I take by "really imaginable" you mean "behaviorally, functionally, or physically--" but that's pretty much achieved in the thought experiment itself since they're defined as being "behaviorally... etc." identical to us with the exception of not experiencing consciousness. I don't know how a p-zombie would be different behaviourally, physically, or functionally, so maybe you could describe it to me. And ontologically negating consciousness begs the p-zombie's own question of consciousness' ontology. I was saying the idea is that PZs are "behaviorally, physically, and functionally" indistinguishable from conscious beings. The major point is to show that you can't prove conscious experience merely through behavior, physicalism, or functionality. I don't quite understand your second sentence (mostly just the "begs the..." part). I'm not entirely sure which part you want me to reply to or think is relevant to my statement. I think in the abstract considering two mutually exclusive things possible is, by its nature, not a rejection of the other. If I flip a coin and don't observe the outcome, then I must maintain that both heads and tails are possibilities even while knowing that only one is a metaphysical possibility. It's the same with PZs and materialism/monism.
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fatpaul
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Post by fatpaul on Apr 13, 2017 20:27:04 GMT
Do you know when two atheists agree, some theist somewhere is crying!
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 20:34:01 GMT
Yes. I said as much in this post: imdb2.freeforums.net/post/241360/threadBut beyond that, it's clear that some things can only be possible/impossible because of definitions while some things--the composition of water, what is or causes consciousness--are not just about definitions but also a posteriori evidence, typically empirical. So would you say, for example, that married bachelors are logically possible just in case we define "bachelor" as "male who is amenable to being married, but who isn't necessarily married at present"? Yes, though I'm not sure what you think the "isn't necessarily" adds to the definition in this case.
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 20:40:19 GMT
BTW, to everyone involved in the P-Zombie discussion, there's two active threads in the Philosophy forum right now about consciousness if you care to participate.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 21:19:27 GMT
So would you say, for example, that married bachelors are logically possible just in case we define "bachelor" as "male who is amenable to being married, but who isn't necessarily married at present"? Yes, though I'm not sure what you think the "isn't necessarily" adds to the definition in this case. Right. So anything/everything is potentially both logically possible and logically impossible on your view, right? It just depends on what definition we use.
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 21:22:27 GMT
The p-zombie argument asserts that physically identical humans who happen to not be conscious are conceivable, and it concludes that because of this, it is a metaphysical (not just logical) possibility. And then it concludes from that that physicalism is false. Yeah I'm basically saying this in that a logical possible p-zombie implies not a necessary physical monism. "implies not a necessary physical monism" = "does not imply a necessary physical monism"?
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Post by Eva Yojimbo on Apr 13, 2017 21:42:52 GMT
Yes, though I'm not sure what you think the "isn't necessarily" adds to the definition in this case. Right. So anything/everything is potentially both logically possible and logically impossible on your view, right? It just depends on what definition we use. Yes in a sense, but it also depends upon the existence of things that exist in definition only VS things that are empirical in nature. You don't discover "marriage" by observing reality, it only exists as a concept we defined. This isn't necessarily the case with something like "consciousness." Definitions play a role in defining the concept of consciousness, but we're also trying to define the concept in conjunction with our experience of it, which isn't the case with "bachelor" and "marriage"
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Post by Terrapin Station on Apr 13, 2017 21:46:11 GMT
Right. So anything/everything is potentially both logically possible and logically impossible on your view, right? It just depends on what definition we use. Yes in a sense, but it also depends upon the existence of things that exist in definition only VS things that are empirical in nature. You don't discover "marriage" by observing reality, it only exists as a concept we defined. This isn't necessarily the case with something like "consciousness." Definitions play a role in defining the concept of consciousness, but we're also trying to define the concept in conjunction with our experience of it, which isn't the case with "bachelor" and "marriage" So then logical possibility isn't solely about definitions/language in your view?
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