Why science and atheists fall short in explaining consciousness.
Dec 2, 2018 20:48:25 GMT
drystyx likes this
Post by heeeeey on Dec 2, 2018 20:48:25 GMT
Excerpt:
Some hard questions
How can physical processing create inner, subjective experience?
How can matter possess first person perspective?
How can mere electrical signals produce qualitative sensation and awareness?
Why should information “feel” like anything in the first place?
These questions are functionally synonymous and define what philosophers have dubbed the “hard problem of consciousness”, a concept that many neuroscientists have embraced. Conversely, the “easy problem” (although it is also extremely difficult) is figuring out all the computational and cognitive mechanisms underlying consciousness, which is categorically different than describing experience. Previously, science has only concentrated on solving those questions related to the “easy problem of consciousness”. Some still believe that questions about subjective experience can’t be answered quantitatively, and are therefore only appropriate topics for philosophy. Others handle the situation by refusing to acknowledge the existence of consciousness altogether! However, the truth of consciousness is self-evident, and denying it is equivalent to denying one’s own existence. IIT is unique in that it recognizes consciousness as a real phenomenon that can be described objectively and mathematically.
But does IIT really address the “hard problem of consciousness”, i.e., how subjective experience arises from the physical?
The answer is not quite.
The brain stores and processes information, but how and why that information takes on the characteristic of “feeling like something” is left unexplained. IIT tells us how to measure the degree of consciousness (Phi or Φ), but does not tell us how different types of information acquire different subjective sensations, like the feel of a burning flame or an orgasm. As stated by philosopher Ned Block, it may be that Phi is correlated with consciousness, but does not play a role in its cause.
How can physical processing create inner, subjective experience?
How can matter possess first person perspective?
How can mere electrical signals produce qualitative sensation and awareness?
Why should information “feel” like anything in the first place?
These questions are functionally synonymous and define what philosophers have dubbed the “hard problem of consciousness”, a concept that many neuroscientists have embraced. Conversely, the “easy problem” (although it is also extremely difficult) is figuring out all the computational and cognitive mechanisms underlying consciousness, which is categorically different than describing experience. Previously, science has only concentrated on solving those questions related to the “easy problem of consciousness”. Some still believe that questions about subjective experience can’t be answered quantitatively, and are therefore only appropriate topics for philosophy. Others handle the situation by refusing to acknowledge the existence of consciousness altogether! However, the truth of consciousness is self-evident, and denying it is equivalent to denying one’s own existence. IIT is unique in that it recognizes consciousness as a real phenomenon that can be described objectively and mathematically.
But does IIT really address the “hard problem of consciousness”, i.e., how subjective experience arises from the physical?
The answer is not quite.
The brain stores and processes information, but how and why that information takes on the characteristic of “feeling like something” is left unexplained. IIT tells us how to measure the degree of consciousness (Phi or Φ), but does not tell us how different types of information acquire different subjective sensations, like the feel of a burning flame or an orgasm. As stated by philosopher Ned Block, it may be that Phi is correlated with consciousness, but does not play a role in its cause.
More and more atheists and scientists are realizing that they fall short in explaining consciousness and are moving away from the currently accepted 'answers'.
